Poland as a Euro-Atlantic Power the determinants of U.S.-Polish relations 1989-2005 by Bielewicz, Marcin D.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2005-12
Poland as a Euro-Atlantic Power the determinants of
U.S.-Polish relations 1989-2005
Bielewicz, Marcin D.












Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
POLAND AS A EURO-ATLANTIC POWER:  










 Thesis Advisor:   Donald Abenheim 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time 
for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing 
and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this 
collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, 
Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-
4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
December 2005 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE:  Poland as a Euro-Atlantic Power: the 
Determinants of U.S.-Polish Relations 1989-2005 
6. AUTHOR(S) Marcin Dariusz Bielewicz 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     




     AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
The present study treats the evolution of Polish-American security relations since 1989, with special focus on 
the diplomatic events since 11 September 2001. The study poses the question as to what forces, personalities and 
events led to the rise of Poland as a power in the transformed Europe of the 21st century, particularly as this 
phenomenon has been visible in US-Polish alliance statecraft. The newly democratic Poland, eager to avoid the fate as 
in the years from the end of the 18th century until 1945, sought a durable security bond with the United States via Euro-
Atlantic structures, as well as integration into what became the European Union. Polish diplomatic and political elites 
hoped that a formal alliance with the United States would eliminate the vulnerabilities and risks of the first half of the 20th 
century. The new turmoil of the 21st century, however, poses a great question mark over such statecraft as was evident 
in the events of diplomacy and alliance cohesion as developed in the years 2002 until 2005. While Poland quickly 
stepped to the side of the US in the wake of the assaults on the United States, and the strategy of the Bush 
administration radically to transform Iraq, the protracted war in Iraq and beyond, as well as frictions between the 
European powers have all exacted a price. Polish diplomacy and alliance statecraft must strike a balance between the 
demands of its close security partnership with the United States and the rest of its NATO allies, as well as the need to 
become a valued and effective member of the European Union, despite the latter’s setback in the course of 2004 and 
2005. 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
89 
14. SUBJECT TERMS Poland, United States, Transatlantic Relations, Atlanticism, European 
Union. 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
POLAND AS A EURO-ATLANTIC POWER:  
THE DETERMINANTS OF U.S.-POLISH RELATIONS 1989-2005 
 
Marcin D. Bielewicz 
Lieutenant, Polish Army 
B.S., Tadeusz Kosciuszko’s Millitary Academy, 2000 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 










Author:  Marcin D. Bielewicz 
 
 







































The present study treats the evolution of Polish-American security 
relations since 1989, with special focus on the diplomatic events since 11 
September 2001. The study poses the question as to what forces, personalities 
and events led to the rise of Poland as a power in the transformed Europe of the 
21st century, particularly as this phenomenon has been visible in US-Polish 
alliance statecraft. The newly democratic Poland, eager to avoid the fate as in 
the years from the end of the 18th century until 1945, sought a durable security 
bond with the United States via Euro-Atlantic structures, as well as integration 
into what became the European Union. Polish diplomatic and political elites 
hoped that a formal alliance with the United States would eliminate the 
vulnerabilities and risks of the first half of the 20th century. The new turmoil of the 
21st century, however, poses a great question mark over such statecraft as was 
evident in the events of diplomacy and alliance cohesion as developed in the 
years 2002 until 2005. While Poland quickly stepped to the side of the US in the 
wake of the assaults on the United States, and the strategy of the Bush 
administration radically to transform Iraq, the protracted war in Iraq and beyond, 
as well as frictions between the European powers have all exacted a price. 
Polish diplomacy and alliance statecraft must strike a balance between the 
demands of its close security partnership with the United States and the rest of 
its NATO allies, as well as the need to become a valued and effective member of 






























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 vii




I. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................. 1 
A. PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE......................................................... 1 
1. Purpose .................................................................................... 1 
2. Significance.............................................................................. 2 
B. U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE..................... 2 
C. ARGUMENT......................................................................................... 4 
D. OVERVIEW .......................................................................................... 6 
II. SECURITY DILEMMAS 1989-1999................................................................ 9 
A. AFTER THE END – THE OBJECTIVES OF THE POLISH 
FOREIGN POLICY AFTER 1989....................................................... 11 
B. THE POLISH PATH TO NATO .......................................................... 15 
1. Poland in New Political-Military Situation............................ 16 
2.  Efforts to Join NATO ............................................................. 19 
3. The Process of Integration with NATO ................................ 26 
4. Poland Enters the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ....... 29 
C. CONCLUSIONS................................................................................. 34 
III. STRONG PARTNERSHIP, 1999-2003 ......................................................... 37 
A. POLAND – A NEW POWER IN EUROPE ......................................... 39 
1. Relations with Russia and Ukraine ...................................... 41 
2. European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and 
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)............................................ 44 
B. GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM...................................................... 46 
C. CONCLUSIONS................................................................................. 50 
IV. POLAND – DISAPPOINTED FRIEND 2003-2005........................................ 53 
A. POLAND’S SUPPORT OF THE WAR ON IRAQ............................... 54 
1. The “Axis of Evil” and the “Coalition of the Willing” ......... 54 
2. Decision of Polish Government to Send Troops to Iraq..... 57 
B. IMPACT OF U.S.-POLISH RELATIONS ON POLAND’S EU 
MEMBERSHIP ................................................................................... 60 
C. CONCLUSIONS................................................................................. 63 
V. CONCLUSIONS............................................................................................ 65 
A. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS............................................ 65 
B. POLICY IMPLICATIONS ................................................................... 67 
LIST OF REFERENCES.......................................................................................... 69 


































I would like to thank my thesis advisors Professor Donald Abenheim and 
Colonel Hans-Eberhard Peters for their patience and assistance in completing 
this thesis. I would like to thank my wife Barbara for her support and motivation, 
without which I would not have been able to accomplish this work. 
Last, but surely not least, I want to thank my American colleague Major 




























I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE 
1. Purpose 
What diplomatic and strategic factors account for the rise of the special 
U.S.-Polish bond since 1989? To determine the factors that shaped U.S.-Polish 
relations, one must understand the historical dimension of Poland’s security 
dilemma.  
In the seventeenth century, Poland conducted several wars with both its 
external and internal foes that strengthened Poland as a European power, but 
weakened it politically. The source of instability in this third largest country in 
contemporary Europe was the involvement of the great powers in Poland’s 
internal power play. Different parties sought support form outside the country for 
their interests, which critically lessened Poland’s military and political might and 
finally led to its partitioning in 1772, 1793, and 1795. After the end of the Poland-
Lithuania Commonwealth in 1795, Poland was reduced geographically to the 
realm between two great powers, Russia and Germany. For the next two 
hundred years, Poland was subordinated to their will.  
During the short interwar period, 1918-1939, Poland became an uneasy 
actor among the European powers, as it tried to balance its foreign policy 
between Russia1 (later the Soviet Union) and Germany. Nonetheless, its 
geopolitical location determined that it was to become a victim of the power 
politics of the neighboring countries.  
Parallel to its efforts to heal relations with its neighbors, Poland sought 
military allies in Great Britain and France. Unfortunately, those allies were 
unprepared and unwilling to support Poland in 1939, and even less so in 1945. 
This experience with unreliable European allies is the main factor that influenced 
Polish foreign policy after the end of the Cold War. Poland chose the United 
                                            
1 During the Russian Civil War, 1917-1921, and until the creation of the Soviet Union on 
December 30, 1922, the country was still called Russia. See: R. Pipes, A Concise History of the 
Russian Revolution, Knopf, New York, 1995. 
2 
States as a guarantor of Polish sovereignty not only because of the Second 
World War experience, but also primarily because Poles had always perceived 
the United States as a role model of liberty and independence. Despite the fact 
that it was the president of the United States who decided to hand over Poland to 
Stalin at Yalta, there is a persisting opinion among Poles that the United States is 
Poland’s best friend.2 Moreover, Poland would like to seize the opportunity to 
leverage U.S. support for Poland’s return to the European community as a 
regional power and as an important actor among European decision-makers. 
2. Significance 
Since 1989, the Polish leadership has sought close ties with Western 
institutions. This direction in Polish foreign policy became even more important 
after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, when Poland was left with no 
formal allies. From 1991 until 2004, Poland’s foreign policy has won Poland 
membership in the leading international organizations and institutions. In 
addition, the United States forged an increasingly close relationship with Poland. 
In 1991, when the United States formed a coalition to oust Iraq from Kuwait, 
Poland was one of the first to answer the U.S. request for support. From then on, 
U.S. and Polish interests converged, which was an important development for 
both sides. Some European countries, however, had not anticipated the 
blossoming U.S.-Polish relationship, which might caused them to postpone or 
even reject Poland’s efforts to become a NATO and an EU member. The 
situation worsened in 2002-03 when Poland supported the United States in its 
disputes with certain EU powers over the Iraq question. What were and are the 
benefits to the United States from such close cooperation with Poland? What will 
Poland’s role be in the future as an EU member? To keep Poland’s support, the 
United States must understand the driving forces behind this distinctive Polish 
Atlanticism and the objectives of Polish foreign policy.  
B. U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE 
In his now famous Fourteen Points speech in 1918, President Woodrow 
Wilson stated clearly for the first time the extent of U.S. strategic interests in 
                                            
2 Kto Przyjacielem, Kto Wrogiem Polakow? TNS OBOP, Warsaw, February 2003, pp. 3-5. 
3 
Central and Eastern Europe. Wilson realized that people’s right to self-
determination and international support for that right were essential for the 
stability of the region. Countries such as Rumania (Romania), Serbia, 
Montenegro, and Poland should be restored and reconstructed, he said, and the 
Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires should be dismantled to make it 
possible for nations to gain independence.3 
Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points outlined U.S. strategic interests in 
Europe, and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular, which were driven 
mainly by security considerations. The United States believed that a stable 
security situation in the region was essential to a more stable Europe and a more 
stable world. The progressive implementation of the Fourteen Points was 
expected to eliminate the need for worldwide U.S. military involvement in the 
future. 
The United States raised similar considerations in the 1990s during the 
debate on NATO enlargement. The supporters of enlargement pointed to three 
main arguments favoring the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
Poland, first, the development of market economies combined with a 
development of democratic systems in Central and Eastern Europe would create 
regional peace and stability. Second, NATO’s acceptance of these countries 
would prevent Germany from taking unilateral action in the region. Third, if there 
                                            
3 “X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see 
safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous 
development. XI. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories 
restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several 
Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of 
allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic 
independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into. XII. The 
Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the 
other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of 
life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of an autonomous development, and the 
Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all 
nations under international guarantees. XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected which 
should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be 
assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence 
and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.” Fourteen Points Speech 
of the President of the United States, Woodrow Wilson, to the Congress (1918). Source: 
http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/51.htm (accessed November 30, 2005). 
4 
was a post-1989 security vacuum in Central Europe, it could create an 
opportunity for a resurgence of Russian imperialism.4 Other enlargement 
supporters pointed out that supporting the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland 
in their efforts to join NATO would strengthen pro-American sentiments in those 
countries, and thus expand the United States’ sphere of influence to Russia’s 
doorstep.5 As this paper will argue, the events of September 11, 2001, showed 
the correctness of those arguments. 
The U.S. strategic interests in Central and Eastern Europe have not 
changed. Although the Global War on Terrorism changed the enemy, security 
considerations continue to drive the U.S. strategic interest in this region. But U.S. 
strategies are not aimed at a specific threat. They are intended rather to shift the 
collective defense burden onto European shoulders and to foster allies who will 
give unquestioning support to American military initiatives. 
One example of the success of this policy in Central and Eastern Europe 
is the support of Poland, the largest country in the region, for U.S. military 
operations. Poland is a U.S. ally in Afghanistan and Iraq and a reliable supporter 
of U.S. political and military actions on the international stage. Moreover, Poland 
is a dedicated propagator of U.S. policies in Central and Eastern Europe. 
C. ARGUMENT 
Transatlantic relations, NATO, the European Union, and Central European 
security issues are the subjects of numerous recent publications, including 
Andrew Michta’s America’s New Allies,6 Jeffrey Simon’s NATO Enlargement and 
Central Europe,7 and Ronald Asmus’s Opening NATO’s Door.8 These texts 
                                            
4 J. M. Goldgeier, Not Whether, But When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO. Brookings 
Institution Press, Washington D.C., 1999, p. 12. 
5 S. Kay, NATO Enlargement: Policy, Process, and Implications. In A. A. Michta, America’s 
New Allies: Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO. University of Washington Press, 
Seattle, 1999, p. 150. 
6 A. A. Michta, America’s New Allies: Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO. 
University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1999. 
7 J. Simon, Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO Expansion. National Defense 
University, Washington, 1995. 
5 
cover a major problematic issue: the integration of post-communist countries into 
the European and Atlantic security and political structures. They describe the 
disputes between allies over the who, when, and how of joining the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization and the role of the United States in this process.  
In Poland: A New Power in Transatlantic Security, Marcin Zaborowski and 
David Dunn describe Poland’s perspective on the new situation in transatlantic 
and European relations. They detail the tenets of the Polish strategic culture and 
community, showing Poland’s situation during the 1990s.9 
John Harper, in his American Visions of Europe, and Thomas Risse-
Kappen, in Cooperation Among Democracies, provide background information 
about U.S. foreign policy and decision making towards Europe. Both authors 
illustrate the United States’ attempts to control Europe through the 
counterbalancing of rising powers and alliances. Harper even claims that “the 
United States should therefore promote the ‘evolution of the European 
Community in the direction of a looser, purely economic entity with broader 
membership rather than tighter political entity with an integrated foreign policy.’”10 
Risse-Kappen’s book also lays a theoretical base for explaining U.S.-Polish 
relations in the realm of international relations. 
The major debate about the reasons for a distinctive Polish Atlanticism is 
being conducted on two levels: Polish public opinion as expressed in the popular 
media, and academic analysis conducted in scholarly journals and publications. 
The general populace is upset by such issues as the entanglement of Polish 
forces in Iraq, U.S. visas for Polish citizens, and lack of economic profit from its 
support of the United States in the GWOT. The academics are divided into two 
groups, Atlanticists and Europeanists. The Atlanticists support the Polish 
government’s decisions and its claim that Poland benefits politically from its                                             
8 R. D. Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door. How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era. 
Columbia University Press, New York, 2002. 
9 M. Zaborowski, D. H. Dunn, Poland – A New Power in Transatlantic Security. Frank Cass 
Publishers, London, 2003. 
10 J. L. Harper, American Visions of Europe: Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, and 
Dean G. Acheson. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p. 335. 
6 
relations with the United States, whereas, Europeanists claim that Poland is 
being used by America in the European power game, thus repeating a German 
newspaper charge that Poland is America’s “Trojan Donkey,”11 or agreeing with 
President Chirac that Poland should follow the common Franco-German vision of 
a United Europe. 
This thesis will answer two major questions: What are the factors that 
determine the Atlanticist character of the Polish strategic community? and Why 
should the United States maintain a strong relationship with Poland? This study 
will argue that, after 1989, influential forces in Poland’s domestic politics 
established elitists groups with strong Atlanticist views, leading to a critical 
change within the Polish strategic community. The main goal of this study is to 
answer one overriding question: What factors account for the rise of the special 
U.S.-Polish relations since 1989? 
D. OVERVIEW 
Chapter II, Security Dilemma, covers the period 1989-99 in U.S.-Polish 
relations, from Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki’s 1990 exposé, to the 
accession of three new NATO members on March 12, 1999, in Independence, 
Missouri. This chapter will address two questions: How did Poland construct its 
national security? and Why did Poland choose the United States as its primary 
ally? The chapter examines decisions made by the Polish strategic community 
that led to Poland’s support for the United States in its interventions in Iraq (1991 
Gulf War), Bosnia, Haiti, and Kosovo.  
The third chapter, Strong Partnership, covers U.S.-Polish relations from 
1999 to 2003. To exemplify the importance of U.S.-Polish bilateral relations 
during this period, the chapter will discuss the set of events that changed the 
nature of American foreign policy. The terrorist attacks on U.S. targets in Africa 
and Yemen, the attacks on September 11, 2001, Operation Enduring Freedom in 
                                            
11 R. Foroohar, What New Europe? Everyone’s Pitting the Established Against the Upstart, 
But on the Issues That Matter, the Split Doesn’t Exist. Newsweek (International edition), New 
York, January 23, 2003, p. 36. 
7 
Afghanistan, and Operation Iraqi Freedom, all had a significant impact on U.S. 
relations with its European allies, particularly Poland.  
In the years since September 11, 2001, relations between Poland and the 
United States have only intensified. There was an increased exchange of military 
training and the resolution of a dispute over new fighter planes for the Polish Air 
Forces, together with a huge economic offset. This chapter tries to explain the 
reasons why the United States has chosen Poland as a primary ally among the 
“new Europe” states. 
The final chapter, Disappointed Friend, covers the period 2003-05. After 
intensive efforts by the international community to force Iraq to follow the UN 
resolution on monitoring Iraq’s military and WMD facilities, the United States 
decided to act unilaterally against Saddam Hussein’s regime. Poland was a 
member of the “coalition of the willing” that supported the United States. 
Unfortunately for both Poland and the United States, most of America’s 
European allies, chief among them France and Germany, were strongly against 
this campaign. Because these events took place on the eve of Poland’s 
accession to the EU, they could have resulted in postponement, if not outright 
cancellation of Poland’s membership. For the United States, they resulted in the 
loss of strong allies in Europe at a time when transatlantic relations were already 
in bad condition and when the Global War on Terrorism needed all the support 
possible. 
This chapter tries to explain why the Polish government, despite 
opposition from parliament and society, decided to join the U.S.-led coalition in 
Operation Iraqi Freedom and send troops to Iraq. It also tries to delineate Polish 
reasons for such support for U.S. policy. Finally, this chapter tries to answer the 
question: Will Poland, as an EU member, remain a strong ally and supporter of 
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9 
II. SECURITY DILEMMAS 1989-1999 
The Roundtable Talks in Warsaw of 1989 started a critical democratic 
change in the Polish political system. Two months of debates (6 February – 5 
April 1989), between communist and opposition representatives in three sub-
committees, helped Poland to change its political structure from communism to 
democracy in a peaceful way.  
An agreement was reached on April 5, 1989. The initial settlement 
ensured the free elections to Senat (Upper Chamber of Polish Parliament), the 
parity representation in Sejm (Lower Chamber of Polish Parliament)12, and an 
institution of the President13. The free elections in June 1989, to Senat were a 
disaster for communists and overwhelmingly showed who had the support of the 
people of Poland – the opposition won ninety-nine out of one hundred mandates 
to the Upper Chamber.14 It was vivid sign of inevitable transformation of the 
Eastern Bloc. Despite the great success of the opposition in Poland, there 
reminded the significant concern about Moscow’s attitude toward the 
transformation. It was only after an unsuccessful attempt (by Nicolae Ceausescu) 
to consolidate the Warsaw Pact forces to protect communist rule in Poland15 and 
a Gorbachev advisor’s statement that “the Soviet Union will not intervene in 
Polish internal affairs,”16 that these concerns were dismissed. 
However, despite the lack of imperial intentions toward Poland from both 
its traditional enemies – the Soviet Union (later Russia) and Germany – Poland 
                                            
12 In the coming elections to Sejm, the sides of the Roundtable Talks agreed to share 
numbers of mandates as follows: 65% went to communist party and its subordinates (PZPR, ZSL, 
SD, PZKS, PAX, UChS), 35% went to opposition. A. Albert (W. Roszkowski), Najnowsza Historia 
Polski 1914-1993. Vol. 2. Puls Publications, London, 1994, p. 874. 
13 First President of PRL (People Republic of Poland) after 1989, was elected by the National 
Assembly (Sejm and Senat together) by only one vote. A. Albert, Najnowsza... p. 893 
14 A. Albert, Najnowsza..., pp. 874-876. 
15 A. Albert, Najnowsza..., p. 895. Also in W. Kuczynski, Zwierzenia Zausznika. Gazeta 
Wyborcza, 29 February 1992. 
16 A. Albert, Najnowsza..., p. 839. Also in Z. Domaranczyk, Sto Dni Mazowieckiego. 
Warszawa, 1990, p. 18. 
10 
found itself in a security vacuum even before the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact 
in 1991. It was assessed that, “the Treaty has already lost its ideological role… it 
should serve disarmament and cannot impede the unity of the continent.”17 
Considering its violent history, the Warsaw Pact was perceived to be more of a 
threat than a guarantor of security for its members.18  
Therefore, still within the structures of dying Warsaw Pact and far from 
gaining membership of any defense oriented organization, Poland started to look 
for new allies. Taking into consideration the history of the Warsaw Pact and 
Poland’s experience with its neighbors and European allies, from the very 
beginning, Poland directed its eyes on the only democratic dominant power in the 
modern world – the United States.  
There were a number of advantages, which helped to sell the idea of the 
alliance with the United States to the Polish nation. First, is the role of history. 
Such individuals as generals Tadeusz Kosciuszko and Kazimierz Pulawski are 
both Polish and American heroes. Moreover, it was the American contribution to 
the victorious side in both world wars, especially the First World War (with 
President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points), which reincarnated Poland as an 
independent state. These events are greatly appreciated by Poles and have a 
special place in their hearts. Second, is the military and economic superiority of 
the United States in the world. Third, is the Polish Diaspora. Almost 10 million 
people of Polish origin live in the United States. Finally, Poles have always 
dreamt the “American Dream” and appreciated the American way of life. In the 
1989, during the visit of President George Bush, Poles hoped that Poland could 
become America of the East as a center of prosperity.19  
                                            
17 Sejm Exposé by Minister for Foreign Affairs of the RP, Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Warsaw, 
April 26, 1990. Zbior Dokumentow – Dokumenty z Zakresu Polityki Zagranicznej Polski i 
Stosunkow Miedzynarodowych. Warsaw, 1990, No 2. 
18 Hungary 1956, Poznan events (Poland) 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968, and Polish Crisis 
1980-81. 
19 M. Putzel, Walesa Asks U.S. Firms’ Investment; Poland Lowers Business Barriers, 
Chamber Told. The Washington Post, Washington D.C., Mar 23, 1991, p. b01. Also in H. Rainie, 
To Play on the Field of Dreams. U.S. News & World Report; Jul 24, 1989; 107, 4; Research 
Library p. 18. 
11 
These feelings were much stronger than the bitterness of Teheran, Yalta, 
Potsdam, and President Roosevelt’s ambiguous policy toward the Polish 
Question during the WWII.20 
A. AFTER THE END – THE OBJECTIVES OF THE POLISH FOREIGN 
POLICY AFTER 1989 
…When we speak about the reason of state with particular 
reference to our country, we have to realize that there are certain 
imponderabilities in the idea. They can be put briefly as those of 
honor and respect. I mean self-respect and respect for others. Self-
respect most certainly implies the imperative to pursue our own 
external and internal policies in a way that will make us succeed at 
all times in defending ourselves as effectively as we can against 
decisions and settlements that external forces may try to impose on 
us. This posture opens up the way for cooperation with partners 
who are stronger and for collaboration with those who are 
smaller…. This is also stance that does not rule out wise 
compromises, which are pre-eminently the essence of politics, and 
by the same token it does eliminate false compromises which are 
always dangerous. If politics is the art of possible, it should also 
signify the art of being able to attain the objectives set for oneself. 
For Poland, such objectives must be great ones.21 
Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs,  
Krzysztof Skubiszewski,  
Address to the Sejm 
Warsaw, January 21, 1993 
In 1989, a geopolitical sense of bipolar reality in the world politics ceased 
to exist. Several factors accounted for this change. Firstly, the revolutions within 
Central and Eastern European countries triggered an implosion of the Eastern 
Bloc that further led to the breakdown of the West – East world system. 
Secondly, the dissolution of the Soviet Union unbalanced the existing balance of 
power in the world, leaving the United States as the only world superpower. The 
consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Union were more complex than that. 
The emergence of the new independent states (former Soviet republics), some of 
                                            
20 J. L. Harper, American Visions of Europe. Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, and 
Dean G. Acheson. Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 92-3, 102-4, 119, 127. 
21 What is the Polish Reason of State in the Face of Current Political, Economic and Social 
Challenges? – Sejm Address by the Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski. Zbior 
Dokumentow – Dokumenty z Zakresu Polityki Zagranicznej Polski i Stosunkow 
Miedzynarodowych. Warsaw, January 21, 1993.  
12 
them with remnants of the Soviet nuclear power on their territories, required 
revision of the foreign policy and security strategies. Thirdly, the West, in a 
political sense, was the only institutionalized and organized Bloc remaining on 
the international stage. Hence, the West was destined to press the progressive 
reforms in the new Europe. Fourthly, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the unification 
of Germany opened up the case of border regulation. The former Eastern Bloc 
countries in general, and Poland in particular, were afraid that revisions 
supported by the only hegemon in the modern world – the United States – might 
be in favor of Germany. Finally, the reemergence of Central Europe as a 
geopolitical entity created a dangerous situation for the West. The new European 
countries, among them Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia,22 demanded that 
the West take action to assist these democracies in their transition process.  
These changes in the international system helped the transformation of 
domestic politics. In Poland, anticommunist opposition grew stronger, gained 
access to power, and from then on was strongly influencing the foreign policy of 
the country. Transformation of the political and economic system from 
communism and a centralized economy, to democracy and a market economy, 
together with a strong anticommunist establishment made progress on reforms 
irreversible. 
Polish foreign policy of the early 1990s was preoccupied by redefinition of 
its role and function in the new post-Cold War environment. This process 
required answers on several questions, such as: who are Poland’s enemies? 
who are Poland’s friends?, what should be the position of a democratic Poland in 
international politics?, how should Poland deal with the Soviet Union (later 
Russia and former Soviet republics)?, what are the dangers to Polish national 
security? 
                                            
22 Later only Czech Republic kept momentum of the integration with the Western institutions. 
After divorce with Czech Republic, Slovakia failed with political and military reforms, caused by 
political instability, and could not keep up with requirements imposed by the Western institutions. 
See J. Simon, Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO Expansion. National Defense 
University, Washington, 1995, pp. 141-148. 
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Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Minister for Foreign Affairs 
Krzysztof Skubiszewski presented, in their exposés, the priorities of Polish 
foreign policy, when the first non-communist government was formed.23 The 
main goal of Polish government in the early 1990s was to restore the full 
independence of Poland.  
Foundation of the foreign policy of our state is the national interest 
and the Polish reason of state implemented with respect for 
dictates of morality and for international law….Our policy serves 
independence. It supports political and economic transformations in 
Poland and strengthens this country’s international position within 
the new European and international order now being created.24 
 There were nine priorities of Polish foreign policy for the 1990s. First, 
active participation in creation of a European security system, and in the process 
of unification of the continent. Second, friendly coexistence with its mighty 
neighbors – the Soviet Union and Germany. Third, regional cooperation. Fourth, 
political, economic, and cultural ties with the United States and Western Europe. 
Fifth, expanding relations with Latin America and non-aligned countries. Sixth, 
reduction of foreign debt and efficient use of financial aid. Seventh, cooperation 
with international organizations. Eighth, strengthening of the rule of law in 
international relations and protection of human rights. Finally, creation of a 
friendly atmosphere for foreign travel, and assist Polonia25 in contacts with 
Poland and vice versa.26 
                                            
23 First Polish government formed after the Round Table Talks agreements, was still in part 
communist. Although, in the beginning key ministries were kept by communists, the Prime 
Minister position was held by former dissident Tadeusz Mazowiecki. Therefore, this government 
is called the first non-communist Polish government since WWII. See A. Albert, Najnowsza 
Historia Polski 1914-1993. Vol. 2. Puls Publications, London, 1994, p. 895. 
24 Sejm Exposé by Minister for Foreign Affairs of the RP, Krzysztof Skubiszewski. Zbior 
Dokumentow – Dokumenty z Zakresu Polityki Zagranicznej Polski i Stosunkow 
Miedzynarodowych. Warsaw, April 26, 1990. 
25 The term Polonia is used officially in Poland to describe people of Polish descent living 
outside of Poland – Polish Diaspora (e.g. American Polonia). See: Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate 
Dictionary 11th edition. Merriam-Webster Inc., Springfield, 2004. 
26 Sejm Exposé by Minister for Foreign Affairs of the RP, Krzysztof Skubiszewski. Zbior 
Dokumentow – Dokumenty z Zakresu Polityki Zagranicznej Polski i Stosunkow 
Miedzynarodowych. Warsaw, April 26, 1990. 
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The European unity policy remained the main stream in Polish foreign 
policy throughout 1990s. Consecutive governments were expanding this idea 
through bilateral and regional ties in the region. Poland became a regional power 
broker and important international player. Although unity of the continent 
remained the main goal, every priority mentioned above was subordinated to the 
supreme aim – restoring full sovereignty.  
The problem of the border on the Oder and Neisse line constituted the 
main issue in bilateral relations with Germany. Therefore, Poland’s participation 
in the “2+4” conference in 1990,27 was a crucial change in world politics and 
great achievement of Polish foreign policy. This conference marked the end of an 
era when great powers decided about the future of smaller countries. It marked 
the end of the “about us, without us” decisions.  
The next step toward full independence was to free Poland from remnants 
of communist ties, both military and economic. In 1990, Poland was still in the 
structures of the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. 
This created a potentially grave danger to the national security. While Poland did 
not want to be tied to ineffective organizations, she was left her without formal 
alies after these organizations ceased to exist.28 Hence, 1990s represented a 
dangerous situation for Poland’s self-sufficiency. 
Regional cooperation and relations became very important for Polish 
foreign policy. Creation of the Visegrad Group – Poland, Czechoslovakia, and 
Hungary – consolidated efforts of its members more effectively to cooperate with 
                                            
27 Agreement regarding Polish-German border between unified Germany and Poland was 
signed on November 14, 1990. See A. Albert, Najnowsza Historia Polski 1914-1993. Vol. 2. Puls 
Publications, London, 1994, pp. 896-897. 
28 The Warsaw Pact ceased to exist on July 1, 1991 in Prague, but its military structures 
were dismantled on February 25, 1991 in Budapest. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
was terminated on June 28, 1991.  
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NATO and the Western European Union.29 Pursuing its aim to become an 
important regional actor in Central Eastern Europe, Poland gained membership 
in so called “Pentagonal Group,” thereby extending Polish influence to the south 
of the continent.30 Furthermore, Poland, Germany, and France formed the 
“Weimar Triangle” in an attempt to overcome historical boundaries. However, this 
initiative was not very useful for Poland, although it did give Poland an 
opportunity to express its will and opinions on the broader international forum, 
and what was more important, an opportunity to be heard and considered.31 
In this light, Poland of early 1990s considered different options for its 
future role on the European and international stage. The Polish elites also 
considered neutrality. However, Poland’s geopolitical location forced the 
dismissal of any dreams about neutrality. Finally, Polish foreign policy was 
directed to pursue integration with the Western institutions, namely the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union. 
Due to the fact that the European Union was a relatively young institution 
which was still in the process of determining its internal composition and because 
of the weakness of Polish economy, Poland decided to direct all its effort to 
achieve NATO membership. 
B. THE POLISH PATH TO NATO 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization was founded on April 4, 1949 as a 
military alliance of Western European and North American countries. In its first 
forty years, NATO was a guarantor of security, freedom and independence of its 
                                            
29 Declaration of the Republic of Poland, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, and the 
Republic of Hungary on Cooperation in Pursuit of European Integration. Zbior Dokumentow – 
Dokumenty z Zakresu Polityki Zagranicznej Polski i Stosunkow Miedzynarodowych. Visegrad, 
February 15, 1991. Also Statement by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the “Triangle States” 
Concerning Cooperation with the NATO. Zbior Dokumentow – Dokumenty z Zakresu Polityki 
Zagranicznej Polski i Stosunkow Miedzynarodowych. Cracow, October 5, 1991. 
30 After accession of Poland to the Pentagonal Group, it changed its name to Hexagonal 
Group. In 1992 it changed name to the Central European Initiative (CEI). Source: the Central 
European Initiative website: http://www.ceinet.org/main.php?pageID=16; (Accessed November 
27, 2005). 
31 O. Osica, In Search of a New Role: Poland in Euro-Atlantic Relations. In M. Zaborowski, 
D. H. Dunn, Poland – A New Power in Transatlantic Security. Frank Cass Publishers, London, 
2003, pp. 25-28. 
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members. It provided essential strategic balance of power in Europe, and 
supported both democratic values and institutions. NATO had created stability, 
which was a critical factor for preventing hostile relations between East and West 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  
These events were significant for the Treaty, and enabled reorientation of 
its policy. Doing this, kept its basic function – to provide security for its members, 
it also enabled the continuation of building peace in Europe. 
Poland – the country in the heart of Europe – has a fundamental role in 
the process of stabilization and security on the continent. However, decisions 
made by the powers in the end of World War II, created a situation in which, until 
1989, Poland was under the strong influence of the USSR.  This situation lasted 
until the end of 1980s, when revolutionary changes in Central-Eastern Europe, 
especially Gorbachev’s perestroika and later dissolution of communist block, 
allowed Poland to choose its own way of development. 
After termination of the Warsaw Pact, Poland was in a situation of forced 
self-sufficiency – without any formal ally, without any external assurances of its 
security. Looking for new security model, Poland chose entering the structures of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and West European Union (later European 
Union) - the pillars of political stability and peace in Europe. 
1. Poland in New Political-Military Situation 
The policy of perestroika, initiated by president of USSR Mikhail 
Gorbachev in April 1985, accelerated the breakdown of communistic political 
systems in Central-East Europe. Moscow gave its allies a “free hand” to choose 
their own way of development. Poland and Hungary were the first nations from 
the Eastern Bloc to take advantage of this situation, introducing political pluralism 
in spring of 1989.  
The disintegration of the Eastern Bloc was the critical factor which 
accelerated the evolution of NATO’s military and political doctrine. The effect of 
these changes was an important declaration of NATO members during the NATO 
summit in London on 5-6 July 1990. It stated that, if former Warsaw Pact’s 
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countries express a willingness to not be recognized as enemies, NATO no 
longer would recognize them as such. 
Meanwhile, on July 3, 1990, with the blessing of world powers, the 
unification of Germany came true. 
In spring of 1991, the military structures of the Warsaw Pact were 
dismantled, and on July 1, 1991, the leaders of six countries gathered in Prague 
agreed on the definitive termination of the Pact. 
The aftermath of these events, in December of 1991, was collapse of 
Soviet Union and creation of Russian Federation, and new independent states – 
former soviet republics. Former enemies now recognized themselves as 
partners. In consequence of insistent efforts of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and 
Poland, NATO created on 20 December 1991 North Atlantic Cooperation Council 
(NACC). Gathering all NATO members and former members of Warsaw Pact, it 
became consulting body between former enemy’s blocks.32 
Collapse of the Eastern Block did not cause similar processes in the West, 
because NATO preserved its most important role – guarantor of security of its 
own members. Indeed, changes in the Central-East Europe lessened its military 
importance, its political authority increased significantly instead. Furthermore, 
efforts toward formulation of the new strategy had been undertaken.33 
In the West, unification of Germany, resulted that Poland became 
immediate neighbor of NATO, where there still were Soviet military units. Further 
changes were expected after withdrawing soviet troops from Germany and 
Poland.34 
                                            
32 R. Zięba, New Conditions of Security in Central-Eastern Europe. Wojsko i Wychowanie, 
1994, No. 4, p. 92. Also in R. D. Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door. How the Alliance Remade Itself 
for a New Era. Columbia University Press, New York, 2002, p. 17. 
33 P. Wieczorek, Premises of Poland’s Security in 1990s. Wojsko i Wychowanie, 1991, No. 7, 
p. 64. Also in R. D. Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door. How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New 
Era. Columbia University Press, New York, 2002, pp. 16-17. 
34 S. Koziej, Evolution of Poland’s Defense Circumstances in 1990s. Myśl Wojskowa, 1991, 
No. 2, p. 25. Also in R. D. Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door. How the Alliance Remade Itself for a 
New Era. Columbia University Press, New York, 2002, pp. 6-7. 
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 Although, there was no real danger for the national existence, the 
unstable situation in the East produced some anxieties among Polish citizens. 
Polish national interests were often in contradiction with policy of Poland’s 
eastern neighbors. In these days, there had not been any real, international, 
lawful guarantee, accord or agreement affirming security of Poland’s external 
borders.35  
Poland is a European country powerful enough that, in reality, 
without approval from Polish society, no country in European 
continent, would have rational military capabilities to conduct 
successful and total aggression on our country…. However, there is 
only one condition… this is to retain country’s military defense 
system on adequate level of readiness and proficiency….  There is 
also need to looking for allies, but only this kind of allies from which 
we could keep our military autonomy. This goal is attainable only, 
when the country is militarily enough strong ….36  
Obviously, that whole Europe is in entirely new situation. However, 
the degree of changes in the field of security applies particularly to 
Poland. First of all…we were left without official allies, so without 
any military assurance from outside, in situation of forced self-
sufficient defense. Thereupon, doing calculations, by us – military, 
we are constrained to rely on our own forces, even if we would like 
also to consider, in our calculations, reliable allies….37 
In that situation, the leading issue for Republic of Poland, had been to 
prepare the country to be part of the European security system, already in 
transition itself. Few variants were considered: a) neutrality status; b) creation of 
buffer countries union between NATO and USSR; and c) obviously Poland as a 
NATO member.38 
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1992, No. 11, p. 82. (Translated by the thesis author) 
37 B. Balcerowicz, Problems of Polish Military Strategy. Wojsko i Wychowanie, 1992, No. 12, 
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Finally, the option of gaining membership in the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization prevailed, as the Organization was recognized as the main pillar of 
the political stability and peace in Europe. Playing such important role, it could 
not neglect threats of international security in Europe. Therefore, it was decided 
that main strategic goal for Poland in 1990s, was the integration with NATO and 
Western European Union, which was seen as European pillar of NATO, and 
critical element of European common security system.39 
Still, before the creation of common security system in Europe, lack of 
allied guaranties deprived Poland of any means of collective defense in case of 
military aggression. In that situation, main effort was put toward foreign affairs, 
which was to focus on creation of military cooperation with neighbors and NATO 
countries.40 
2.  Efforts to Join NATO 
The post-WWII history of Europe undoubtedly confirms the effectiveness 
of NATO as a defensive alliance and institution that bond Atlantic countries into 
political, social, economic, and culture spheres. NATO successfully balanced the 
military power, and conducted countermeasures to the activity of the USSR on 
the international stage. It was the factor that guaranteed a persistence of 
connections binding the United States and Western Europe and anchoring 
Germany within Western European structures41 
However, Article X of the Washington Treaty42 permitted the possibility of 
its extension, though membership for Poland was unlikely, at least until the end 
                                            
39 L. Wałęsa, Assumptions of Polish Security Policy. Wojsko i Wychowanie, 1992, No. 12, p. 
4. 
40 P. Wieczorek, Premises of Poland’s Security in 1990s. Wojsko i Wychowanie,1991, No. 7, 
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of the 1990s. Two factors determined this fact: first, the hesitation of NATO-
member countries to integrate with post-communistic countries, which resulted 
from the fear that that move would deepen the feeling of danger and isolation in 
the USSR. Second, NATO members were afraid of integrating with politically and 
economically unstable states from Central and Southeastern Europe. Western 
countries believed that this could force NATO to engage in the internal conflicts 
of countries from the eastern part of Europe, which would lessen the political and 
military cohesion of the alliance.43 
In any case, acceptance of new NATO members was not considered, and 
a gradual more cordial relations between Poland and NATO was fully understood 
and accepted. These activities were, in the eyes of Polish leaders, an opportunity 
to increase Poland’s security. 
The first official contact between Poland and NATO took place in March 
1990 in Brussels when then Polish Ministry of Defense, Krzysztof Skubiszewski, 
was visiting NATO Headquarters. In July 1990, the president of Poland, Lech 
Walesa, paid a visit to NATO HQ with a similar purpose, and established official 
diplomatic relations with NATO. These meetings had a significant impact on the 
further development of a dialog with NATO, which had inaugurated broader 
cooperation in the political and military spheres.44 
Relations between Poland and the USSR, which so much worried the 
West, were expected to be dealt with by the new international agreement, which 
would govern all issues, especially these regarding economical and technological 
matters. Nevertheless, those cases depended on development of the situation in 
the USSR, which was already at the edge of total anarchy, a breakdown of the 
state structures, and bankruptcy. Even from the Polish point of view and its 
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efforts for joining NATO, the case of settling up the relations with the USSR was 
relevant.45 
In terms of their looking for guarantees of international security, there was 
a common view that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE) would help former Warsaw Pact countries enter European structures, 
and would consolidate a common European identity. In light of those ideas, the 
CSCE became the only forum that encompassed various realms of relations 
between all European countries and relied on a political and legal foundation 
agreed to by all members of the Conference. Poland, through the CSCE, had an 
opportunity to consolidate hitherto changes in Europe.46 
Under the pressure of governmental and academic circles in the West, in 
the early 1990s, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary inaugurated cooperation 
within the so-called Visegrad Group.47 The first meeting of the Group took place 
in Bratislava in April 1990; it produced no substantial results. Moreover, it 
seemed that every country wanted to be close to Western Europe in their own 
way, and alone. However, in autumn of the same year, works under the project of 
declaration of cooperation within the Visegrad Group were resumed. Thereupon, 
on February 15, 1991, in Visegrad, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary signed 
the “Declaration of Cooperation between the Republic of Poland, Czech and 
Slovak Federation, and Republic of Hungary Aspiring Towards European 
Integration”. This declaration announced their united, harmonious efforts to the 
foster relations with European institutions, to conduct dialog on security matters, 
and to develop cooperation.48 
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Influenced by the fast changing post-Cold War situation in Europe, NATO 
policy toward the East had been transformed. On 6-7 June 1991, NATO 
announced its declaration of “Partnership with Central and East European 
Countries”, which stated that the security of NATO countries is inseparable from 
the security of other European countries. The declaration seemed to be an 
invitation for pro-Atlantic oriented Poland that intensified efforts for its 
membership in NATO. Nevertheless, the responses on this matter, received from 
Brussels and capital cities of NATO countries, were biased. In September 1991, 
then Prime Minister of Poland, Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, was told in Washington 
that neither NATO membership for Poland nor the provision of a security 
“umbrella” over Poland (and all Eastern Europe) was yet possible.49 
Despite another refusal of NATO expansion, relations and cooperation 
between the organization and Poland increased, especially within the NACC. 
Such cooperation included consultations, conferences, and seminars regarding 
security and policy; the exchange of information and experiences regarding 
socio-economic development and conversion of the defense industry; 
cooperation programs in the spheres of science, the environment and civil 
defense; and military cooperation programs and the preparation of joint peace 
operations.50 
However, neither NATO nor the former Warsaw Pact countries were 
satisfied with cooperation only within the NACC. All parties sought new forms of 
cooperation, which were soon found. During a conference of NATO Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs in Travemünde (19-21 October 1993), unofficial debate about a 
new program, a “Partnership for Peace,” took place. This program was to provide 
security cooperation and joint peace support, and humanitarian, and search and 
rescue-type (SAR) operations. A couple months later, during the NATO Summit 
in Brussels (10-11 January 1994), heads of states and governments of member 
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countries agreed on the “Partnership for Peace” program and invited willing 
partners from the NACC and the CSCE to participate in the program. One result 
of this Summit was the “General Framework for the Partnership for Peace”.51 
Although the program was the result of rapprochement by NATO and 
Central and Eastern European countries, in light of the Washington Accord, 
cooperation could not exceed beyond the limit placed on real membership and 
guarantees of protection. Therefore, it was not an acceptance of NATO 
enlargement, but only an action to expand the spheres of stability and 
democracy.52  
The goals of the Partnership for Peace were are described in the General 
Framework: 
• achieving transparency in defense planning, especially in the 
military budget; 
• democratic control over armed forces; 
• create possibilities for participation in UN and CSCE operations; 
• development of military cooperation with NATO, aiming to creation 
of conditions to joint planning, training and exercising, in order to 
upgrade countries’ capabilities to organize and conduct peace 
support, SAR, and humanitarian operations; 
• long range development of partner countries’ armed forces, in order 
to better preparation for interoperability with NATO members’ 
forces.53 
Although the PfP program did not fully correspond with Polish foreign 
policy, Poland decided to cooperate with the program, hoping that achieving 
interoperability and compatibility with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
would help in Poland’s accession to NATO.54 
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On February 2, 1994, in Brussels, then Polish Prime Minister, Waldemar 
Pawlak, signed the General Framework document, ipso facto assuring that 
Poland joined the PfP program. On April 25, 1994, Poland, as the first country to 
join, issued a Partnership for Peace Introduction Document expressing Polish 
intentions to NATO Headquarters: 
The Republic of Poland recognizes Partnership for Peace as a sign 
of NATO engagement in the security of a whole Europe…. Poland 
intends to achieve full NATO membership. Polish authorities treat 
the Partnership for Peace initiative as a means to move us closer to 
achieving this goal, and helping integrate Polish defense structures 
with corresponding NATO structures, as well as technological, 
procedural, and structural modernization of our armed forces 
according to NATO standards…. 
We are certifying our will to, in good faith, fulfill the principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, particularly, to withhold the use of force against the 
territorial integrity and political sovereignty of any country, and 
obligate ourselves to respect existing borders, as well as to resolve 
conflicts in peaceful way…. 
Poland is ready to deliver forces and means essential to 
accomplish the Partnership’s goals, including peace support 
operations. The participation of Polish forces in the Partnership for 
Peace program corresponds with our intention to integrate Polish 
combat units with NATO structures…. 
By accepting the Partnership for Peace program, Poland 
committing itself to cooperation with NATO in order to achieve the 
goals expressed in the General Framework for Partnership for 
Peace …55 
In May 1994, several negotiations took place regarding the mechanisms of 
Poland’s cooperation with NATO. This led to the development of an Individual 
Partnership Program (IPP) for Poland. A draft was issued on June 22, 1994. 
Although it was appreciated by NATO, the ensuing dialog proved to be very 
complicated because of its innovative nature and the differences in planning 
procedures. Moreover, Poland wanted to negotiate a document that would 
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include Polish priorities: full NATO membership and the compatibility of Polish 
armed forces with the forces of NATO countries. The final version of Poland’s the 
IPP was ratified on July 5, 1994, during a NATO Permanent Ambassadors 
Council. Poland was represented by Jerzy Milewski, then the Vice-Minister of: 
Defense, and Robert Mroziewicz, then the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs.56 
Enrolling in the IPP was for Poland a crucial aspect in integrating its 
security policy with NATO structures. Therefore, the economic and political 
integration processes were enriched by the military sphere. In joining the PfP 
program, Poland perceived two opportunities: a consolidation of military relations 
and the achievement of full NATO membership.57 
NATO HQ’s proposals were received in Poland and other aspirant 
countries with suspicions. Hitherto, discussions over the enlargement strategy, 
timelines, criteria, and procedures for new members had been recapitulated in 
the Partnership for Peace offer. It seemed that, through PfP, the organization 
wanted to show their openness toward all countries, but, at the same time, avoid 
giving any security guarantees, and therefore, were far from giving any basis for 
achieving membership. However it was the case in the beginning of the process 
of integration, from the time perspective it turned to be a means rather than 
obstacle for gaining membership. 
Partnership for Peace was a compromise, which in the eyes of critics was 
an expedient short of full membership: 
• Central-East European countries joined PfP despite the fact that 
they expected full membership because they thought that other 
solutions could postpone their accession; 
• NATO countries, reluctant to approve enlargement because they 
feared Russia, but considering new political situation, were forced 
to respond positively to the Central-East European countries’ 
demands; 
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• Russia, which feared isolation, unwillingly accepted the 
participation of post-communistic bloc countries in PfP (and 
eventually, Russia also joined the program).58 
3. The Process of Integration with NATO 
The cooperation between Polish armed forces and NATO was hardly a 
new thing. It was a continuation of commonly executed tasks, during several 
peace support and humanitarian operations.59 
Acceptance of the Partnership for Peace program, Poland showed its 
readiness to cooperate with NATO in the fulfilling the goals expressed in the 
General Framework.60 Poland, the first Partnership country, sent its 
representatives to the Partnership Coordination Cell, a body created by the 
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium.61 
During the NATO Summit in December 1994 in Brussels, the organization 
began to execute the planning and assessment of the Partnership for Peace 
Process, based on the NATO Defense Planning and Assessment Process 
pattern. According to the Process, Poland was obligated to gradually adjust its 
armed forces to NATO requirements, in the fields of equipment, structures, and 
procedures. In return, the organization started to develope standardization 
agreements (STANAG). 
In 1994, NATO conducted several exercises together with PfP countries, 
including Polish troops and observers. The first exercise, Cooperative Bridge ‘94, 
took place on Polish ground, in Biedrusko. It was the first exercise with both 
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NATO and former Warsaw Pact soldiers and became a symbol for reconciliation 
and breaking anticipation between them.62 
Each month advanced such cooperation. Parallel to its relations with 
NATO headquarters, Poland established bilateral relations with NATO countries 
that involved military exercises in the Partnership spirit, consultations between 
experts, cooperation in the sphere of military technology, an exchange of 
delegations; seminars, and conferences, and training. 
On August 18, 1995, Ministries of Defense from Poland, Germany, and 
Denmark, signed an agreement that initiated relations among these countries 
concerning European security issues and mutual initiatives within the PfP.63 
The Polish contingent’s involvement in former Yugoslavia proved decisive. 
In the years 1992-95, Poland maintained an operational battalion in this region 
that was part of the United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR). After the 
end of the conflict and the signing in Paris, on December 14, 1995, of the peace 
accord on Bosnia and Herzegovina, the UN Security Council issued a resolution 
authorizing NATO to implement the military aspect of the Paris Accord under the 
Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. This document authorizes the conducting 
peacekeeping operations, and necessary peace enforcement. For that purpose 
so-called Implementation Forces (IFOR) subordinated to NATO Command were 
organized. The IFOR consisted of military contingents from both NATO and PfP 
countries.64 
Poland decided to prepare its forces for joining IFOR. Therefore, on 
November 6, 1995, the Polish government handed a letter to the NATO Deputy 
Secretary General that stated Poland’s readiness to participate in the mission. 
The legal base for sending Polish troops abroad was the resolution of Polish 
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Council of Ministries, on December 5, 1995, concerned about creation of Polish 
military contingent within IFOR in Bosnia.65 Under authorization of this law, an 
official confirmation letter was sent to NATO HQ accepting NATO’s invitation to 
participate in Operation Joint Endeavour, which was an implementation of the 
Dayton peace accord on Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The core element of the armed forces contingent sent by Poland was the 
16th Airborne Battalion. This unit was the first Polish combat unit to participate in 
a peace support operation, and the first to participate in a peace enforcement 
operation. Considering the fact of Poland’s efforts to join NATO, it was a practical 
exercise showing Poland’s capabilities and its readiness to cooperate within 
NATO structures. 
In December 1995, the battalion reached its intended goal, it was ready to 
project its forces into the area of operation within thirty days. On February 5, 
1996, the Polish battalion had begun its service within the Nordic Brigade, 
together with Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Finland.66 
The result of the military effort in Bosnia and Herzegovina was the political 
stabilization of the region. Thereupon, the UN Security Council issued a new 
resolution appointing Stabilization Forces (SFOR), which after December 20, 
1996, replaced the Implementation Forces. Once again, under the authorization 
of a Council of Ministers resolution dated December 17, 1996, the Minister of 
Defense issued an order for the formation of a Polish military contingent within 
SFOR.67 
Besides operations in the former Yugoslavia in 1996 and 1997, Polish 
units were participating in other NATO/PfP exercises. Among them was the 
Cooperative Guard 96/97, organized by the Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of 
SHAPE, from June 1996 to May 1997. Its main purpose was to prepare a 
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multinational staff to plan and conduct peace support operations under the NATO 
command. 
One of the aspects of cooperation between Poland and NATO is 
participation in exercises and training. In the beginning, it was at 
the platoon and company level. However, our leadership demanded 
an extension of the cooperation and participation of officers in staff 
training and exercises at the tactical and strategic level.68 
An important issue during the preparation for multinational exercises was 
the status of the foreign forces staying within the borders of PfP countries. 
Among NATO countries, however, it was not an issue to worry about, because 
the NATO Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) regulated these matters. But it 
was a different situation when countries outside of NATO were involved. They 
could not be treated in the same manner. Thereupon, in June 1995, NATO HQ 
prepared a PfP Status of Forces Agreement (PfP SOFA) on similar standards as 
NATO SOFA. Poland ratified this agreement in January 1997, after the 
necessary adjustments and changes were made in the Polish legal system.69 
4. Poland Enters the North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
The year 1995 was decisive in Poland’s efforts to gain NATO 
membership. In September, Brussels released its Study on NATO 
Enlargement,70 which described NATO’s role in the new architecture of 
European security, pointing out the ways NATO was involved in international 
efforts for stability and security.71 This document expressed the position agreed 
to by member countries toward NATO enlargement.72 
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An important element of the NATO study was the procedure for new 
members’ accession. At first, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) had to come up 
with an initiative of enlargement, to enable the acceptance of new members from 
the countries that expressed a desire to join NATO. Next, the Secretary General, 
under the Council’s authorization, would inform a particular country that the 
Organization was considering its application. Then, pre-accession negotiations 
could start, which would result in an accession protocol. After NATO-member 
countries’ parliaments would ratify decisions regarding a particular candidate, the 
country had to be sent an official invitation to become a member. The final step 
for full membership was a deposition of the accession document to the NATO 
depository country, United States.73 
The individual dialog with NATO HQ Poland had begun in the spring of 
1996. Like other countries aspiring to NATO, Poland was asked to prepare 
Discussion Papers that presented its view about the arguments included in the 
Study on NATO Enlargement, which was the basis for further discussion and 
consultation. The Polish Individual Discussion Paper about NATO Enlargement, 
was sent to NATO Headquarters in April 1996.74 
That document consisted of arguments for NATO enlargement, pointing 
out capabilities of Poland for strengthening the Organization. Moreover, it 
described how much Poland already fulfilled membership requirements. It 
ascertained that Poland agreed to intensive and individual dialog with NATO and 
approved the rules of enlargement in the NATO study. Thus, Poland, in effect, 
declared its willingness to accept an active partnership in the creation of a 
European security community and agreed to build a European area of stability 
and cooperation, based on NATO.75 
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The Polish document was rated very high, which created a strong basis 
for an extended dialog with NATO. And an effectively conducted dialog could 
give a huge boost to the integration process ahead, even before the  official 
Summit that would designate the countries that would be invited to an official 
accession discussion.76 
On 10-11 December 1996, a meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs 
from NATO-member countries took place in Brussels. After a session of talks, 
they announced that in July 1997 one or a few countries would be invited to 
begin accession discussions with NATO. During the meeting members 
expressed their request that the first stage of NATO enlargement would be 
finished no later than spring 1999, and that the process would then continue 
beyond 1999. in an unofficial statement, they said that Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, or even Romania and Slovenia, would be invited for 
negotiations.77 
The announcement stated that there was no need to install nuclear 
weapons on new members’ territory (an effect of Russia’s pressure). Although, 
Poland had never demanded such actions on its territory, this was considered 
because of security guaranties for Poland.78 
In February 1997, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright presented 
timelines for NATO’s enlargement, together with propositions for Russia 
regarding issues about NATO’s policy toward the East. A given timetable 
provided certain deadlines for the following actions: an invitation to the 
negotiations, ratification of the agreement on NATO enlargement by member-
countries’ parliaments, and issuance of an official announcement about new 
members’ accession.79 
                                            
76 R. Kurpiecki, December Summit in Brussels. Wojsko i Wychowanie, 1997, No. 1, p. 93. 
77 J. M. Goldgeier, Not Whether, But When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO. Brookings 
Institution Press, Washington D.C., 1999, p. 118. Also in: P. Kłudka, Invitation in July? Wojsko i 
Wychowanie, 1997, No. 1, p. 91. 
78 P. Kłudka, Invitation in July? Wojsko i Wychowanie, 1997, No. 1, p. 92. 
79 J. Stańczyk, Poland in NATO. Wojsko i Wychowanie, 1999, No. 4, p. 119. 
32 
On 8-9 July 1997 in Madrid, NATO invited to accession negotiations the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Now the official preparation period had 
begun. On August 1, 1997, the lower chamber of the Polish Parliament (Sejm) 
enacted a bill authorizing the government to start the accession dialog, and to 
obligate them to assure NATO about Poland’s will to fulfill obligations and accept 
costs necessary as a consequence of membership.80 
On July 11, 1997, the Polish National Defense Committee appointed a 
negotiating team to conduct accessing talks. During the two months of 
negotiations (September – October 1997), NATO representatives were assured, 
that Poland (as declared earlier) wished and was able to accept any political, 
military, and financial commitments corresponding with NATO membership.81 
In the middle of 1997, Poland sent its Defense Planning Questionnaire 
(DPQ) to NATO headquarters.82 This was a classified document, dated 
December 31, 1996 that consisted of complete information about the Polish 
armed forces and defense system of Poland, and, based on an armed forces 
development project, a prognosis up to the year 2002. The DPQ is one of the 
most important documents in NATO: it enables members to present real data 
about their armed forces and development. The DPQ consists of three main 
parts: a memorandum, a three-part section (a land, air and naval component), 
and a financial section.83 
On September 24, 1997, the North Atlantic Council invited the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Poland to participate in regular work within NATO 
structures.  
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In November 1997, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, sent the NATO 
Secretary General a letter expressing Poland’s desire to join NATO and 
accepting all the responsibilities that were a consequence of membership. That 
accomplished the official accession debate.84 
On December 16, 1997 in Brussels, members of NATO’s North Atlantic 
Council agreed on the protocol for inviting Poland to the Washington Treaty.85 
During the accession dialogue, Poland was officially informed about the 
possibility of its participation in the daily NATO task and missions. Beginning in 
January 1998, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary would take part in most 
meetings of the Permanent Representatives Council, including the Military 
Committee. They could not take part in some of the allied meetings, such as the 
Nuclear Planning Team and the NATO Committee on Cooperation with Russia 
and Ukraine. The invited countries were officially informed during meetings of the 
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council about the results of NATO meetings with 
Russia.86 
Although they had some concerns about NATO’s enlargement, all sixteen 
members kindly agreed on the accession of the three new members. Poland’s 
efforts were supported on the international arena. Poland conducted intensive 
activity to gain sympathy and support in its aspirations for NATO membership. Its 
main efforts involved the defense system, especially the Polish armed forces, in 
an adjustment of procedures and structures, the introduction of STANAG, and 
participation in the PfP program and the peace support operation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.87 
At the end of 1998, the new members had all finished the Accession 
Protocol ratification process by the members. All their parliaments agreed. An 
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important milestone was the acceptance of the Protocol by the U.S. Senate, 
fostering good climate for ratification by other countries.88 
On January 29, 1999, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana had 
sent a letter to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Bronislaw 
Geremek, in which he officially invited Poland to join NATO. As 
soon as Poland replied to that invitation to the U.S. State 
Department, would be the moment that Poland would become an 
official NATO member. On February 17, 1999, the signature of the 
President of the Republic of Poland accomplished the Washington 
Treaty ratification procedure by Poland. At the moment of handing 
over this document to the treaty depository, the U.S. State 
Department (12 March 1999), the Republic of Poland became the 
NATO member.89 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
The Round Table Talks sparked enthusiasm within Polish society. Poland 
was a leading country in Central and Eastern Europe in the overthrowning of 
communism. There were great expectations, dreams, and prospects for the 
future of a fully independent Poland. The opposition was sure that the mere fact 
of overthrowing communism would itself solve all of Poland’s problems. The 
existing opinion was that grateful Western countries and institutions would 
embrace the tired victor and fix the economic and political problems, and would 
promptly provide it with the necessary security guaranties. Therefore, political 
elites felt there was no need for a plausible plan of reform.  
Only a handful of politicians and academics realized the difficulties of 
Poland’s situation. They understood that their country needed to fix its problems 
by itself. Poland received some economic and political assistance. However, the 
assistance was conditional. The Western financial institutions remembered the 
situation in the 1970s, when the Polish communist government of Edward Gierek 
borrowed enormous amounts of money that was loaned without real obligations. 
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International lending institutions did not want to repeat these mistakes. After the 
Gierek’s fiasco, monetary assistance would have strings attached. 
With the emergence of a democratic system in Poland engender the 
problem of security guaranties. An independent Poland could not rely on the 
communist structures such as the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance. Hence, different options were necessary to solve Poland’s 
security dilemmas. The range of solution stretched from neutrality to association 
with different military structures.  
Considering Poland’s geostrategic location – the source of threats to 
Polish security in the past – neutrality was not an option. Eventually, the 
“Western option” prevailed as the only one relevant and possible at the time. The 
integration with the Western institutions was set as a primary target of Polish 
foreign policy in the 1990s.  
Poland’s primary goal was prompt integration with the European Union. 
However, this would be an arduous, long-term process. Integration with the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization was easier to attain. By its integration with the 
European Union Poland could achieve a long awaited prosperity, while 
integration with NATO military structures would realize its dream of restoring 
Poland as a European power (similar to that of seventeen century). 
Parallel to the Western orientation in Polish foreign policy, there was also 
the challenge of conducting a fair Eastern policy. After 1991, when the Soviet 
Union collapsed, that was even more difficult task. From then on, there were 
several independent actors instead of one. This priority of Polish foreign policy 
was a result of both political and economic factors. Most of Poland’s strategic 
resources come from Russia. Another aspect of the Eastern orientation stemmed 
from the persistent view of Western governments that Russia could divert from its 
path of democratic reforms if the West insisted on NATO or EU expansion to 
include Central and Eastern Europe. Therefore, Poland sought healthy relations 
with its powerful neighbor in order to create an environment conducive to NATO’s 
eastward expansion. Although Poland’s great effort to assure Russia that 
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expansion would not be a hostile act against Russia, it was the Clinton 
administration that solved the problem and gained Russia’s approval for the 
expansion.90 
Almost ten years after Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary had 
overthrown communism in Central and Eastern Europe, and after ten years of 
difficult reforms, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization invited these countries to 
become members of the most successful military alliance in history. This act 
ended the so-called Yalta order in Europe. 
For Poland, however, it was not the end of the integration process: the 
priority of EU integration was yet not fulfilled. However, by achieving NATO 
accession, Poland had the security guaranties necessary to realize its next 
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III. STRONG PARTNERSHIP, 1999-2003 
March 12, 1999, was a day of great accomplishment for Poland. After nine 
years of negotiations and efforts, the Polish national flag rose in front of the 
NATO Headquarters in Brussels. Polish foreign policy achieved the goal set for 
1990s. 
The main driver of Polish foreign policy during the process of negotiation 
with NATO was the desire to become America’s closest European ally, and by 
accession to the Alliance, Poland achieved this goal.91  
The timing of the accession was significant. Less than two weeks after the 
accession ceremony, NATO was ready to wage its first war ever. Unlike some of 
the members of the Alliance, Poland did not hesitate to support NATO’s war 
effort. Poland supported this action politically and militarily, even beyond its 
capabilities. Poland, as a new member of the Atlantic community, did not support 
the United States in words only. Although the Polish Armed Forces could not 
support air campaign because of the lack of appropriate equipment, they 
dispatched ground forces to Macedonia and Albania, and later to Kosovo.92 
Unlike the other new members, Poland showed that it was a reliable 
partner willing to fulfill the obligations thrust upon it. Moreover, by its robust 
contribution to the Organization and support of the U.S. actions Poland exhibited 
its pro-Americanism. Within Polish strategic community prevailed the view that 
the best for Poland would be the close ties with the United States. These views 
could be best illustrated by paraphrasing Dean Acheson and Elizabeth Pond that 
“…the hope of Poland lies in the strength and will of the United States…and in its 
good judgment as well.”93 
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Tying itself to the United States was seen as a great chance to leverage 
Poland’s position on the European and international political stage. Moreover, 
becoming America’s close ally solved Poland’s historical security dilemma. 
By 1999, Poland had already reconsidered its role in international politics. 
Using U.S. support, Poland strove for the position of the new power broker in 
Central and Eastern Europe. However Poland’s leaders understood that the 
position of the country was based mainly upon its relations with the other 
countries in the region. They also understood that “the power of the state and the 
security of its citizens cannot be built today only on the basis of a military 
alliance. The foundation of the country is a modern economy, an effective social 
security system and a conspicuous presence on the great European market.”94  
Therefore, from the beginning of its independence, Poland was enhancing 
economic and cultural ties, while concurrently promoting freedom and human 
rights in Central and Eastern Europe. Even before Poland joined the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization, it entangled itself into different bilateral relations 
with its neighbors both creating new international groups and joining already 
existing ones. Organizations such as the Pentagonal Group95, Weimar Triangle, 
Council of the Baltic Sea States, and Visegrad Group, to name only few, served 
Poland’s aspirations to become a regional power, as well as solved, in some 
extent, Poland’s security dilemma. 
This chapter examines the two aspects that shaped U.S.-Polish relations. 
From 1999-2003 there are two main aspects to the U.S.-Polish relationship. First, 
the emergence of Poland as a new power in Europe. And second, the Global 
War on Terrorism, and its implications for Poland’s relations with the United 
States. These two issues would help to explain the reasons for the development 
of a distinctive Polish Atlanticism, and will help to explain the determinants of this 
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trend in Polish security policy during such an important period for transatlantic 
relations. 
A. POLAND – A NEW POWER IN EUROPE 
Poland’s aspirations to become a new regional power in Central and 
Eastern Europe are very strong among the Polish strategic community and stems 
from its post-WWII experiences.96 However, it should not to be forgotten that 
these ambitions have even deeper roots.  
Poland has a long history as a regional power. As the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth, it stretched its territory from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, 
both connecting and defending Western Europe from Eastern influences such as 
Genghis Khan, the Ottoman Empire, and Communism of the Soviet Union. 
Those challenges forged Poland as a vital element of the European civilization 
throughout centuries. 
Events in Polish history, such as the victory over Teutonic knights in the 
Battle of Grunwald in 1410, the Succor of Vienna in 1683 by Polish King Jan III 
Sobieski, and the defeat of the Red Army in the Polish-Soviet War of 1920-1921 
always reinforced the myth of greatness among Poles. Hence, the idea of Poland 
as a new regional power in the twenty-first century was easy to sell to Polish 
society. 
In 1999, Poland had the historical opportunity to seize an important role in 
transatlantic relations. Finally, Poland did not need to worry about the security of 
its borders. Second, it had powerful and reliable allies. However, some were still 
unwilling to “die for Gdansk,” they would only help Poland when necessary. The 
then Prime Minister of Poland, Jerzy Buzek, in his address to the Polish Diet best 
expressed the relief felt by Poles upon Poland’s accession to NATO: 
The history of Poles of the last two centuries is a hard history, the 
history of nation subjected many times to extreme trials. We had 
few moments of respite, hardly any periods of secure development. 
However, today, ten years after the Polish state regained its 
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sovereignty, we can say: Never before has the international 
situation been so favourable for us. This is so because Poland is 
regaining its place in the family of free European nations. Besides, 
this is hardly anything new. Long ago Adam Mickiewicz said that 
“the stronger Poland felt and shared the family feelings of Europe, 
the happier and more glorious it was; the more it separated itself 
from Europe, the more visible its weakness became….” The 
Republic of Poland is already a member of the North Atlantic 
Alliance. We have obtained real security guarantees…. By entering 
NATO we became stronger thanks to the fact that we agreed to 
abide by the rules in effect in a large international organization that 
protects its members. Mutual obligations also mean mutual 
guarantees.97 
Moreover, Poland achieved the status of an ally and a friend to the strongest 
member of the Atlantic Community, the dominant power in the contemporary 
world, the United States. 
From then on, at every opportunity, the presidents of the Poland’s new 
mentor have expressed their appreciation of Poland’s support and close 
relations. In 1999, the President of the United States William J. Clinton in his 
letter to the President of Poland wrote, “I am proud that Poland is our ally for a 
more stable and secure Europe, that Poland is our partner for democracy and 
prosperity, and that the people of our two nations are lasting friends.”98 
In 2001, newly elected President of the United States, George W. Bush, 
while visiting Poland went even further blessing Poland as a regional power and 
the United States’ most important ally in Central Europe. He said, “I want to thank 
Poland for acting as a bridge to the new democracies of Europe, and a champion 
of the interests and security of [its] neighbors, such as the Baltic States, Ukraine, 
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and Slovakia…. Poland, in so many ways, is a symbol of renewal and common 
purpose.”99 
For the United States, Poland was the ideal reason to push NATO 
enlargement further to the East. Poland’s successful adaptation to the new role 
as a NATO member and reforms of the military sector were received in 
Washington with great appreciation, giving those who first fiercely supported 
enlargement a strong argument to proceed further. Prompt response for the 
NATO’s call during the war in Kosovo showed Poland’s dedication to the 
Alliance. From then on, the United States considered Poland as a model ally and 
the regional leader of Central and Eastern Europe.100 
1. Relations with Russia and Ukraine 
Another aspect of Poland’s leadership in the region was its relations with 
its neighbors, particularly with Russia and Ukraine. Where the former strongly 
opposed Poland’s accession to NATO, and the latter, traditionally anti-Polish, 
had substantial military force to challenge any Polish attempts to gain regional 
power status. Therefore, a carefully conducted foreign policy toward these 
countries was critical. 
Relations with Russia were (and still are) very important for the new Polish 
foreign policy for a number of reasons. First, Russia was still an important actor 
on the international stage, which was revealed during the pre-enlargement 
negotiations, when Russia emphatically vetoed inclusion of Poland into the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization. Although, Russia was still the power that mattered, 
it became clear that she could not stop the process.101 Russia involuntarily 
became the engine of the second NATO enlargement. Overcoming Russia’s 
fierce opposition to the first found of enlargement, together with Poland’s 
                                            
99 ‘No More Munichs. No More Yaltas – Lift Up Your Hearts.’ Address of the President 
George W. Bush to Faculty and Students of Warsaw University – June 15, 2001. Embassy of the 
United States in Warsaw, Poland.  
100 D. H. Dunn, Poland: America’s New Model Ally. In M. Zaborowski, D. H. Dunn. Poland: A 
New Power in Transatlantic Security. Frank Cass Publishers, London, 2003, p. 70. 
101 M. K. Albright, Stop Worrying About Russia. The New York Times. New York, Apr 29, 
1998, p. A.25. 
42 
successful adaptation to its new role in transatlantic security was the top priority 
of Washington’s pro-enlargement elites, and gave them a strong argument for 
the second round of enlargement.102 
Second, Russia was one of the main factors pushing Poland toward the 
United States. Traditional fear of Russian imperialism among Poles combined 
with a fear of possible rebirth of Russian territorial aspirations in the Central and 
Eastern Europe caused unequivocal and unquestionable acceptance of 
dependence from the United States among Polish security community.103  
Third, Russia began establishing closer ties with Western countries, and 
with the United States in particular. Russia was looking for both economic 
support for its devastated economy after the collapse of the Ruble in 1998,104 
and political support, especially for its war in Chechnya. Here Poland, knowing 
the realities of the region and having strong relations with countries within the 
region, could play an important role as a tool of NATO and the EU Eastern policy. 
Poland could serve as a bridge between those former enemy blocks.  
Relations between Poland and Russia worsened after the first NATO 
enlargement, when three former communist countries entered the Atlantic 
Alliance. The historical burden of their mutual relations mixed with the lack of 
flexibility of both actors and the new situation in international politics after 
September 11 led to tensions and vivid confrontation between Poland and 
Russia. The fault was on both sides. 
Poland, as a NATO member felt much more comfortable and more 
confident on international stage. Poland tried to use its new powerful ally, the 
United States, to exercise pressure on Russia as hereditary of the Soviet Union, 
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to take responsibility for injustice of the Soviet era.105 Poland demanded that 
Russia take the blame for the Soviet invasion of September 17, 1939, and the 
crimes that followed. Poland demanded release of classified NKVD files 
regarding Polish citizens held in captivity after the invasion. The most important 
issue was the case of Katyn, where Polish officers and intelligentsia were 
murdered by the Soviet secret police.106 
Poland achieved relative success dealing with the Katyn issues. Russia 
allowed a commission consisting of Polish historians limited access to the 
restricted files of the investigation into the case of Polish officers kept in captivity 
in the Soviet Union after September 17, 1939.107 Poland’s relations with Russia 
improved because Russia aware of its condition and internal problems (i.e. 
Chechnya and economic crush), needed all possible support, and could not 
afford to jeopardize its relations with the Western World at that time.  
The change of this situation came with the events of September 11, 2001. 
The new war on terrorism required new means, new strategy, and new allies. 
The new U.S. allies were mainly from outside of the Atlantic Alliance. Among 
them Russia emerged as a primary ally in the war on terrorism. This was seen in 
Poland as a potential threat.108 
Although Poland was usually neglected in the relations between the 
United States and Russia, and between NATO and Russia, it achieved the status 
of an expert on Central and Eastern Europe among NATO members, especially 
                                            
105 C. Bobinski, Polish Illusions and Reality. In A. Lieven, D. Trenin, Ambivalent Neighbors. 
The EU, NATO, and the Price of Membership. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
Washington, 2003, pp. 240-41. 
106 J. Rothschild, N. M. Wingfield, Return to Diversity. A Political History of East Central 
Europe Since World War II. Oxford University Press, New York. 2000, p. 28. 
107 Poland to Get Access to Russian Files on Katyn. News Bulletins. Embassy of the 
Republic of Poland, Washington D.C. 
http://www.polandembassy.org/News/Biuletyny_news/News_2004/p2004-08-05.htm, (Accessed 
21 November 2005). 
108 For further information on the issue see: O. Osica, Poland: A New European Atlanticist at 
a Crossroads. In K. Longhurst, M. Zaborowski, Old Europe, New Europe and the Transatlantic 
Security Agenda. Routledge, New York, 2005, pp. 129-130. 
44 
the United States. From then on, Poland’s views were considered before any 
policy was pursued toward such Eastern European countries as Ukraine.109 
Poland became an very important player in relations between NATO, EU, 
and Ukraine. It was even more important for the United States regarding this 
issue. Heavily involved in Ukraine and very pro-American, Poland was the best 
tool to be used by U.S. administration toward Ukraine. Furthermore, the 
establishment of the Polish American Ukraine Cooperation Initiative in 1999 was 
a clear sign of U.S. confidence in Polish foreign policy. The Initiative is an 
intergovernmental institution that uses Polish knowledge and assessment to help 
direct U.S. economic assistance to the Ukraine.110 
2. European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and Ballistic 
Missile Defense (BMD) 
Additional indicators of Poland’s Atlanticist orientation were shown during 
the debates over the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) and the European Defense 
and Security Policy (ESDP).  
Poland’s approach to ESDP was consistent with that of the United 
States.111 In other words, Poland was against the new ESDP which challenged 
the United States’ role and presence in Europe. Poland feared ESDP would lead 
to the withdrawal of the United States from Europe, and brings back the kind of 
insecurity felt during the interwar years.112  
Poland felt that building European rapid reaction forces could give more 
power to the leading European countries, such as France and Germany, which 
could lead to a weakening of NATO’s role in the European security structure. 
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Furthermore, Poland feared that a decreased NATO role and U.S. withdrawal 
from Europe might cause Russia to exert stronger influence on European 
security. Additionally, vague formulation of the conditions and exclusion of non-
EU NATO members from security decision-making process, caused concern in 
Warsaw.113 
Regarding the BMD issue, Poland was initially not interested in the new 
anti-missile defense idea. Additionally, conflict between Europe and the United 
States over the issue of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which was later rejected 
by the United States was not a good sign for Poles. Thus, Poland was trying to 
avoid hasty decisions about the issue.114   
Despite the early hesitation, Poland was ready to support any 
development of the anti-missile shield encompassing her territory. Moreover, 
Poland was ready to host any element of the system on its soil.115 This decision 
was a result of the political calculation that the establishment of a NATO 
installation on Polish territory, would increase its importance in the Alliance. the 
former Polish Minister of Defense explained the decision by emphasizing the 
importance of Poland’s geographical location and expressed the desire that 
Poland become part of the common defense system.116 
Poland’s NATO membership solved Polish security dilemma. Poland had 
found itself in the security situation never experienced before. For the first time in 
her history, she had strong allies, which, when necessary, would come with 
assistance. Among Polish political elites, exists a belief that Poland owes its 
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membership in the Atlantic Alliance to the U.S. administration. In fact, the 
administration of President Bill Clinton strongly supported pro-American Poland 
in the run for membership in the Alliance.117 Hence, considering these factors it 
was very probable that Polish appreciation would go further beyond words in the 
future. 
B. GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM 
Transatlantic relations deteriorated  after the end of the Cold War, 
However, bad the condition of relations throughout the 1990s, the real crisis 
came after the events of the 9/11. 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, brought sympathy and 
support of the nations around the globe for the United States. For the brief 
period, just after 9/11, it seemed that transatlantic relations would have its 
renaissance. The disputes between Atlantic allies calmed down, leaving center  
stage to Alliance unity. The solidarity of the allies against terrorism was perceived 
as a critical element of the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance in the future.118 
Enthusiasm among the coalition against terrorism, which was visible 
before and during war in Afghanistan, did not last long. Not more than half a year 
later the divide among allies became even more visible. It was a result of several 
factors such as the personality of new American president George W. Bush, U.S. 
unilateralism versus European multilateralism, the new U.S. security strategy, 
and the debate over Iraq. Those differences between allies nearly destroyed 
transatlantic relations. It became evident that it was the end of the transatlantic 
relations as we knew them.119 
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The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were 
perceived by the United States as the casus belli. It led to the invoking of Article 
5 of the Washington Treaty by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Article 5 
was designed for the purpose of the common defense of the Alliance, and had 
never been used before. The European allies responded according to the terms 
of Article 5.120 The allies dispatched early warning airborne centers (AWACS) to 
patrols along U.S. coast and froze bank accounts believed to belong to terrorist 
organizations.121 
However, as cooperation within the Alliance seemed to bloom in early 
weeks after 9/11 the first cracks on the surface of the cohesion of NATO 
appeared. Some like Jeffrey Lantis even suggest that “allied cooperation after 
September 11 was running mainly on policy momentum left over from the Cold 
War and not a fundamental reorientation and new consensus on foreign policy 
direction.”122  
Growing differences between the United States and Europe over the 
threat perception and the way to deal with it turned initial enthusiasm among 
allies into annoyance with each other. For the United States, it was terrorism that 
posed the primary threat to its security. Whereas European allies, most of them 
already having dealt with terrorism on their soil, were focused on economic, 
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ethnic, ecological and religious problems in their countries, and did not perceive 
terrorism as a major threat.123  
Moreover, Americans were annoyed by the slowness of decision-making 
process of the Alliance124, as well as by the lack of adequate capabilities.125 
Therefore, the United States decided to pursue the idea of a “coalition of the 
willing,” which meant to form “coalitions defined by the mission” from outside of 
NATO. This new approach of the U.S. administration to conducting the war on 
terrorism became apparent in the wake of Operation Enduring Freedom in 
Afghanistan, but it was not wholly comprehended yet by the Europeans.126 It was 
expressed later in the new U.S. Security Strategy. 
The operation against the terrorist network Al Qaeda and Taliban regime 
in Afghanistan began on October 2001. The NATO allies offered their resources 
to help fight terrorism within a coalition led by the Americans. However, although 
they were willing to assist their senior ally and share the burden of the war, the 
allies wanted to have a voice in the decisions on how this war would be 
conducted. Such an arrangement was not on U.S. agenda.127 Instead, the United 
States focused on the countries which did not necessarily share their liberal and 
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democratic worldview, such as Russia, Tajikistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and 
Kazakhstan. 
Being consistent with its policy toward the United States, Poland wanted 
to show that it was a valuable ally, even if that means support for U.S. unilateral 
action. Poland was among the first nations that decided to share the burden of 
the operation in Afghanistan and supported the United States militarily and 
politically. President George W. Bush accepted Polish symbolic help with 
enthusiasm.128  
One outcome of the new American policy of “coalitions of the willing” 
became worrisome for Poland. It was the fact that the United States was looking 
for allies who preferred to use military power as a primary tool of foreign policy. 
Although Poland appreciated the usefulness of solving problems using military 
power, the selection of these new allies worried Poland. In other words, the rising 
importance of the U.S.-Russian relationship and the position of Russia in the 
coalition against terrorism were perceived in Poland as a potential threat to its 
security.129 
Russia emerged as a primary U.S. ally in the war on terrorism. Previously, 
Russia was constrained by the conditions under which she was receiving 
economic help from the Western countries. These conditions included 
democratic reforms and “good behavior” in relations with its neighbors. Now that 
Russia was such an important actor in the coalition, President Putin could 
neglect some of those conditions, and even gain additional support such as 
recognizing Chechen rebels as terrorist. Moreover, Russia hardened its position 
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in the relations with its neighbors, particularly Poland and Baltic States, which in 
the longer run endangered future NATO enlargement.130  
The events of September 11 and the publication of the new U.S. National 
Security Strategy in 2002 have changed transatlantic relations. Acting 
unilaterally, the United States endangered relations with its traditional allies. 
Moreover, seeking “coalitions of the willing” outside of the Alliance, especially 
among the countries that did not share its democratic values created an 
atmosphere of suspicion and uncertainty about America’s intentions. America’s 
traditional allies became subjected to the role of providers of post-conflict 
reconstruction and stability. 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
Since 1999, Poland had enjoyed the status of a U.S. close ally. It was 
even strengthened after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, when Poland 
was one of the first to respond to the U.S. call for a global war on terrorism in 
several ways. First, by hosting an international conference on terrorism just after 
9/11, in which president George W. Bush took part via satellite link.131 Second, 
by sending troops to fight terrorist networks in Afghanistan. And finally, by 
providing political support for any U.S. action. 
On the one hand, the United States helped Poland in its development and 
levered its position in Europe in several ways. First, by providing strong support 
for Poland’s membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, for which 
Poland was greatly appreciative and which Poland would never forget. Second, 
the President of the United States pronounced Poland as a regional power and a 
representative of U.S. policy and interest in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Additionally, the United States supported Poland in her efforts for integration with 
the structures of the European Union. 
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The time between 1999 and 2003 became the most intensive and 
successful period in U.S.-Polish relations. Poland received the status of close ally 
to the United States and as a result also received significant support. U.S. 
support also helped to increase Poland’s position on international stage. 
The United States, on the other hand, gained a reliable and loyal ally. 
Driven by the fear of Russian resurgence, Polish security policy was formulated 
around doing everything possible to maintain the status of America’s closest ally. 
It must be understood that Poland is not a country the United States 
considers as indispensable for protecting America’s vital interests. Although the 
United States would not sacrifice its more valuable relations (i.e. with France, 
Germany, or United Kingdom) for the sake of relations with Poland, Poland has 
become a reliable and trusted partner, whose unequivocal support for U.S. 
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IV. POLAND – DISAPPOINTED FRIEND 2003-2005 
The years 2003-2005 have been very important for U.S.-Polish relations. 
The main issues that occupied Polish foreign policy after 2002 were Poland’s 
support for the U.S.-led invasion on Iraq, and finalization of Polish accession to 
the European Union. 
However disputes over Iraq and Saddam Hussein’s regime among Atlantic 
allies was a new situation that emerged after September 11, as a result of earlier 
problems within the Alliance. In the first place, the American unilateral approach 
to the war on terrorism was not consistent with European traditional 
multilateralism. Secondly, the introduction of a new American security strategy 
with the concept of “coalitions of the willing” left European allies with the feeling 
of abandonment, which further led to the loosening of transatlantic ties. Lastly, 
America’s European allies, in particular France, after brief a period of solidarity 
and cooperation just after the attacks on World Trade Center of September 11, 
returned to their traditional anti-Americanism. 
In this environment, in 2002 Poland’s foreign policy outlined two main 
priorities for the coming years. These objectives were expressed by Wlodzimierz 
Cimoszewicz, then Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs: 
In light of the changing circumstances the foreign policy of the 
Government of the Republic of Poland will acknowledge the 
following premises in the program for 2002 and the successive 
years: Firstly – the need of continuity with regard to the strategic 
priorities of this policy in the scope of Euro-Atlantic issues and the 
integration with the European Union….132 
In other words, the priorities of Polish policy were: to support U.S. actions 
against Iraq and to negotiate the best possible conditions for Poland before 
accession in 2004. 
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Poland’s support for the United States and its integration into the 
European Union are two linked matters of Polish statecraft. Whereas the former 
is the result of Poland’s security guarantees, the latter is mostly driven by 
economic considerations. Indeed, both those issues are interrelated and have 
impact on each other. The main problem is that Poland wanted to satisfy two 
opposite directions in its foreign policy – to be a good U.S. ally and to a be good 
European, without betraying either. 
This chapter examines the Polish government decision to support the 
United States in its war against Iraq, as well as the impact of the strong 
relationship with the United States on Poland’s EU membership. This chapter 
also explains the disappointment expressed by the Polish public opinion and 
political elites with the U.S.-Polish relations. 
A. POLAND’S SUPPORT OF THE WAR ON IRAQ 
The decision to support U.S. action against Iraq was one of the most 
important and probably the most difficult decisions for Polish government since 
1989. It was a choice that could change the position of Poland on the 
international stage. It was also a decision that could alienate Poland within the 
European Union at the time when the accession negotiations were heading for 
finalization by the beginning of 2004. 
1. The “Axis of Evil” and the “Coalition of the Willing” 
The events of September 11, 2001, seemed to galvanize the Atlantic allies 
to hold the same view on the problem of terrorism. This element had the 
possibility of revitalizing transatlantic relations, such as those between the United 
States and France. However, the outcome was quite the contrary. 
Despite the great support the United States achieved from its European 
allies, America decided to act unilaterally. In other words, America welcomed any 
support from other countries, but reserved the leadership and decision-making 
process for itself. Earlier disagreements between transatlantic allies over U.S. 
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rejection of the Kyoto Agreement in 2001,133 genetically modified food,134 the 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty,135 and International Criminal Court136 were colored 
by the 9/11 events, which gave great opportunity for the United States to 
renegotiate these issues. Unfortunately for transatlantic relations, it was not on 
the agenda of President George W. Bush’s administration. Hence, the United 
States sustained its stance toward these issues, which irritated America’s 
European allies. 
The first signs of American unilateralism were visible during operations in 
Afghanistan, but were mainly ignored by international public. Many felt that 
Americans were better prepared to this kind of operation and provided most of 
the assets to this operation, hence, U.S. leadership was understandable and 
acceptable. In January 2002, President George W. Bush introduced America’s 
new superpower worldview in his State of the Union Address. This address 
revealed the depth of American unilateralism.137 
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The address frightened America’s European allies. The “axis of evil” 
pronouncement revealed the most probable course of action for the United 
States and meant that Afghanistan would not satisfy the United States’ 
aspirations. Here traditional European multilateralism and pacifism clashed with 
American unilateralism and growing militarism over the way to deal with security 
crises. 
This was the case when the United States prepared itself to topple the 
rouge state of Iraq. Although, the United States tried to use the United Nations to 
legitimize its future action against Saddam Hussein’s regime by forcing the 
United Nation Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1441, it announced that it 
would act even without the UNSC approval.138  
After the resolution draft had been trimmed and adjusted to the final 
version, which overcame opposition from France and Russia, the United Nations 
Security Council approved Resolution 1441 unanimously.139 Although the 
Resolution represented a successful reconciliation among the Security Council 
members on the Iraq case, its ambiguity was used by Saddam Hussein to divide 
the UNSC members by not fully complying with the requirements of 1441.140 
In America’s eyes, Iraqi non-compliance with the UNSC Resolution 
automatically triggered military action against Iraq. The other UNSC members 
and some U.S. allies, namely France, Russia and Germany, did not share this 
view. In this situation, the United States decided that it would act militarily even 
without support of its allies.141 
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Any remaining doubts about American unilateralism were dismissed by 
the publication of the U.S. National Security Strategy in September 2002. the 
centerpiece of this strategy was the concept of “coalitions of the willing,” which 
was seen by the Europeans as a threat to the cohesion and relevance of NATO. 
In other words, the Europeans feared that the United States would seek allies 
among countries which did not necessarily share its liberal democratic values, 
but could share its priorities, namely Russia, China, India, or other pseudo-
democratic countries.142 These worries were not without reason. The new U.S. 
National Security Strategy says that “the mission defines the coalition” and that 
the coalitions must be flexible accepting the countries outside of the Atlantic 
Alliance.143 The U.S. National Security Strategy is the natural continuation of the 
policy introduced by the President George W. Bush in his State of the Union 
Address. The next step in such a policy was the military resolution of the conflict 
with Iraq. If such a policy were pursued, consecutive countries from “axis of evil” 
would face U.S. military intervention. 
2. Decision of Polish Government to Send Troops to Iraq 
A decision to go to war along with the United States was crucial for the 
Polish government. However, it was a dangerous decision to make in light of the 
current situation. Poland undertook this decision on the eve of its EU accession, 
contrary to the position of the two leading EU nations, France and Germany. 
French  President Jacques Chirac expressed his disappointment with the Letter 
of Eight144 in very harsh words and reprimanded the nations who signed it. This 
criticism was especially critical of the three candidate states, which signed the 
letter (the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland). Chirac described the behavior 
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of these states as “infantile” and “dangerous,” and called their action a “missed 
opportunity to shut up.”145 
The reasons for the Polish government’s decision to support the U.S.-led 
coalition against Iraq were deeply rooted in Polish security. Poland’s decision to 
go to war against Iraq was not a response to a direct threat from the Saddam 
Hussein regime. The decision was a result of solidarity and loyalty to Poland’s 
security guarantor – the United States. It was a result of the view that if Poland 
shows its solidarity to its ally, the ally will come with assistance when Poland is in 
danger.146 This way of thinking is distinctive for Polish security culture. Although 
having experienced unreliable allies in its history, Poland nevertheless always 
expressed its commitment and readiness to defend and help its allies. “For 
freedom yours and ours” was a motto of Polish soldiers fighting with allies 
defending and liberating another countries during WWII, while its allies were 
saying that they “will not die for Danzig” in September 1939. Poland was 
determined never to disappoint an ally in need.147 
Poland’s support for the U.S.-led coalition against Iraq was a rational 
consequence of its commitment to become America’s closest ally. Poland 
identifies itself as an integral part of the Atlantic Alliance, whose success, in the 
view of Poles, is based on U.S. presence and leadership. Hence, the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, were perceived in Poland as an “attack on all.” 
This was consistent with the post-9/11 spirit of solidarity among Atlantic allies 
and the invocation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Poland simply felt 
obliged to support its major ally. 
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Poland’s desire to show its reliability as an ally, ready to act and support 
its words with actions, led to the decision to dispatch a relatively small special 
operation unit to the war in Iraq.148 This symbolic gesture from the Polish 
government meant more than might be obvious on the surface. Spain and Italy, 
two countries that supported the U.S.-led coalition, did not send any forces to 
Iraq while the war was in progress. 
Another reason for Polish support for the United States in its war on Iraq, 
was an expectation of benefits from the U.S. side. The reasons, initially of little 
importance for Polish decision-makers, grew in significance later, when the 
occupation and reconstruction of Iraq began.  
Reconstruction of destroyed Iraqis infrastructure by Polish companies, 
rearmament of the new Iraqi army by Polish defense industry, and access to 
cheaper oil, combined with the expected realization of U.S. offset agreement of 
F-16 purchase, were the main economic benefits Poles expected from the United 
States for the participation of Polish soldiers in the Iraq war and stabilization 
efforts. 
Aside from economic benefits, Poles expected that the U.S.’s strict visa 
requirement would be removed. Poland believed that being America’s closest ally 
and strategic partner, second only to the Great Britain, was enough to change 
immigration rules for Polish nationals. On the contrary, after 9/11, obtaining a 
visa was even more difficult.149  
The above-mentioned expectations are the main sources of Polish 
disappointment. These arguments were used by opposition politicians in Poland 
to show that sending troops to Iraq and maintaining strong relation with the 
United States significant policy mistakes of the Polish government and president. 
Opposition politicians stress that Poland did not benefit from its participation in 
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the U.S.-led coalition against Iraq, and claim that Poles should be given at least 
the same visa privileges as France, Germany, and Great Britain.  
Although these arguments did not influence the decision to send Polish 
soldiers to Iraq, their importance grew when President Aleksander Kwasniewski, 
while on a visit to the United States in 2005, received a negative answer to his 
request for the removal of the visa requirement.  
Such pro-American scholars as Zbigniew Lewicki, chairman of the 
American Studies Department at the University of Warsaw, spoke out against 
members of the opposition, advocating a policy for trading U.S. visas and Iraq 
reconstruction contracts for support. Lewicki argued that conditioning the 
decision whether to stay or to withdraw from Iraq on the visa-restriction removal 
was ridiculous and merely an attempt by the opposition to humiliate the 
government on the international stage. He also stated that Poland had benefited 
politically from the close relationship with the United States, and that Poland’s 
status as a U.S. strategic partner helped Poland lever its position in Europe.150 
Although the arguments of Polish Europeanists and Atlanticists diverge 
over the decision by Poland to support operations in Iraq, they agree that that 
decision strongly influenced Poland’s relations both with the European Union as 
a whole and with particular members. 
B. IMPACT OF U.S.-POLISH RELATIONS ON POLAND’S EU 
MEMBERSHIP 
Poland’s EU membership and its relations with the United States seem to 
be separate issues. This is not the case, if one considers the individual decisions 
that determined the direction of Polish foreign policy, Poland’s support for the 
U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, and its stance in debates on the EU constitution. This 
chapter will explore the impact of U.S.-Polish relations on Poland’s EU 
membership.  
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One of Poland’s goals in pursuing close relations with the United States 
was to improve its position on the international stage. Prior to its EU accession, 
Poland attempted to negotiate certain conditions that would strengthen its 
international importance. Poland wanted to enter the European Union as a 
regional power that would be indispensable for the European Union’s 
implementation of its policies regarding the Eastern European region. 
The question was: Did the European Union need Poland as a link with 
Eastern Europe? In some cases, the answer was yes, but not in the case of the 
EU’s relations with Russia and Belarus. The reason is this: traditionally, countries 
like France and Germany had maintained better relations with Russia than 
Poland had, and Russia did not accept Poland’s position as a regional leader, 
especially as it was championed by the United States.  
Though Poland maintained good relations with Russia throughout the 
1990s, the NATO and EU enlargements combined with the events of 9/11 
resulted in a major breach between the two countries. This recent crisis in Polish-
Russian relations has revealed its weaknesses, as well as Russia’s attempts to 
decrease Poland’s importance both in the region and in the European Union. 
First, Russia joined Germany in the efforts to build a natural gas pipeline under 
the Baltic Sea that would encompass not only Polish territory but also the 
territories of the three Baltic states. Second, Russia recently changed a national 
holiday that celebrated the October Revolution to a holiday that celebrates the 
end of the Polish occupation of the Kremlin in the seventeenth century, a 
deliberate attempt to humiliate Poland.151 Historical events like the Ribbentrop-
Molotov Pact, the Katyn massacre, and the September 17, 1939, Soviet 
aggression also continue to overshadow relations between the two countries. 
However, some of the Poland’s actions have also contributed to the 
ongoing friction. For example, Poland tried to exercise pressure on Russia, using 
the United States to force Russia to acknowledge the crimes committed by the 
Soviet Union under Stalin. Moreover, the inflammatory actions of some Polish                                             
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politicians also undermine the possibility of more amiable relations. In 2005, for 
instance. Lech Kaczynski, then mayor of Warsaw, named a street in the capital 
city after the late Chechen leader, Dzhokhar Dudayev.152 
In contrast to its poor relations with Russia, Poland enjoys very good 
relations with Ukraine, relations that are strongly supported by the United States, 
which depends on Polish experts to direct U.S. assistance to Ukraine. The United 
States also supports military cooperation between these countries, especially the 
formation of a Polish-Ukrainian battalion designated as a peacekeeping force.153 
Although the European Union has long viewed a strong U.S.-Polish 
partnership as a threat to its cohesion, the European Union praised Poland for its 
strong relations with Ukraine, which helped prevent a major crisis there during 
the 2004 presidential election. During the so-called Orange Revolution, Poland 
and the European Union joined in mediation efforts to resolve the election 
standoff.154 
U.S.-Polish relations have also strongly influenced Poland’s position on 
the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), which Poland was not in 
favor. However, it supports its central concept and will dispatch troops if 
necessary as long as the ESDP does nothing that endangers the continuation of 
a U.S. presence in Europe and, as a consequence, Poland’s security.  
One aspect of Poland’s EU position, its stance in the EU constitution 
debate was not a result of Polish Atlanticism, but rather was motivated by 
Poland’s aspirations to be an influential regional actor. Polish support for 
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maintaining the terms of the Nice Treaty, however, did reveal the influence of 
U.S.-Polish relations.155 
Poland was not the only state to oppose the change of the Nice system. 
Spain, another member of the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq, supported Poland’s 
opposition. However, after Spain changed governments in 2004 and withdrew its 
support for the coalition, it also abandoned Poland in its fight for a European 
constitution based on the Nice system.156 
Some countries view the proposed change in the voting weight of the 
individual countries in the new EU constitution as an attempt to decrease the 
importance of the newest members, most of whom are Atlanticist-oriented. This 
change in the decision making process favors the two lead nations and original 
EU members, in particular, France and Germany. 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
The U.S. decision to invade Iraq in 2003 was a turning point in U.S.-Polish 
relations, marking a new approach to the relationship within the Polish political 
establishment. However, given the current situation in Iraq, some of Poland’s 
political elites no longer unequivocally support U.S. actions. Their initial 
excitement and admiration changed to disappointment largely because of the 
way the Americans conducted the Iraq operation. As a result, their strong support 
for the unilateral military action also decreased. The Polish populace’s and the 
media’s opposition raised questions about the government’s decision to send 
Polish troops to Iraq, especially after the Polish contingent suffered its first 
combat casualty.  
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Many in the Polish media question the benefits of Poland’s participation in 
the so-called Iraqi Adventure. Skeptics contended that Poland was tricked into 
joining by promises of Iraq reconstruction contracts that never materialized. The 
opposition’s main complaint, however, is that, despite Poland’s strong support 
and commitment to the U.S.-led coalition, Polish citizens still need visas to enter 
the United States and those visas are increasingly difficult to get. The bitterness 
surrounding this issue is significantly exacerbated by the fact that the French and 
Germans, anti-American as they are, can travel easily to the United States – 
without visas. 
But it was the U.S. mistreatment of the captives in the Abu Ghraib and 
Guantanamo Bay prisons that finally consolidated the opposition within Polish 
society to the hegemonic behavior of the United States in general, and to 
President George W. Bush in particular.157 
Poland’s accession to the European Union in 2004 brought the question of 
Poland’s distinctive Atlanticism to the fore, as some European leaders doubted 
whether Poland could be both stanch supporter of the United States and a loyal 
EU member. Although Poland’s support for the United States and its EU 
membership are separate manifestations of Polish foreign policy, they strongly 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
A. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
After 1989 Poland’s security and political situation posed challenges of an 
nature unprecedented nature. The lack of security guaranties, in particular, 
forced Poland to change direction and to develop new foreign and security 
policies. The termination of the Warsaw Pact created the need for either a new 
alliance or membership in the existing one, NATO. Poland, therefore, faced with 
the transformation of the old security system and the consequential need for 
economic reforms, was highly vulnerable to external threats. 
Much of the external threat came from the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
and crises in Eastern Europe. Poland viewed the instability of the political and 
economic systems in its neighboring countries as a danger. To Poles, the danger 
resembled the historic events in Poland in 1939. 
In its search for security guaranties, Poland turned toward NATO, its 
members’ only guarantor of peace and security, the pillar of Western European 
security. As early as 1990, Poland devoted its efforts to integration with the 
Atlantic Alliance. However, for Poland, integration with the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization was only a means to achieve the status of a U.S. ally. 
To Poland, the United States, with its unrivaled military and economic 
superiority, was critical to NATO’s existence. As seen from the Polish 
perspective, the United States had been the guarantor of Western European 
security for the entire post-WWII period. This viewpoint meant that the United 
States was the only power that could possibly guarantee Poland’s security. The 
Polish political leaders understood that, within NATO, a U.S. decision to accept 
new members would be the final decision; thus, “everything depended on the 
United States and its will.” 
Poland demonstrated its dedication to achieving this goal by engaging in 
several actions led by the United States and NATO: Operation Desert Storm in 
1991, Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti in 1994, and the Implementation 
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Forces (IFOR) and Stabilization Forces (SFOR) in the Balkans. Poland’s 
participation in these operations helped create an image of Poland as a reliable, 
loyal ally, ready to support its words with action. 
The opportunity to show such dedication to the Alliance came during the 
Kosovo War, which arose just after Poland became a NATO member. Unlike the 
other two new NATO members, the Czech Republic and Hungary, Poland did not 
hesitate to support the war effort with ground troops. Poles did not forget the 
United States’ support for Poland’s integration efforts. So when the United States 
was attacked on September 11, 2001, by Al-Qaeda terrorists, Poland was among 
the first to respond to the U.S. call to fight a war on terrorism. Moreover, Poland 
strongly supported NATO’s invocation of the terms of Article 5 of the Washington 
Treaty. Poland unequivocally joined the U.S.-led coalition to fight terrorism 
anywhere in the world. It understood and agreed that, as the only superpower in 
the world, the United States, with its superior military power, should lead the war 
coalition. Despite strong opposition from France and Germany to the United 
States’ unilateral approach to solving the terrorism problem, Poland remained an 
ardent supporter. The situation became even more difficult when the U.S. war on 
Iraq started. It was also the eve of Poland’s EU accession.  
Poland became a victim of the transatlantic crisis. Indebted to the United 
States for its support during the process of its NATO accession, Poland now also 
felt obliged to the alliance. Although Poland had close relations with the United 
States, its geographical location also influenced the course of Polish foreign 
policy. Hence, maintaining good relations with its neighbors and behaving as a 
good European state became top priorities in Poland’s international relations.  
The Polish strategic community distrusted the EU as a sole security 
provider. The view that persisted among the members was that only the United 
States could provide relevant security guaranties for Poland. Poland’s support for 
the United States when it was in need would yield a similar reaction from the 
United States when Poland was in danger. The main driver of U.S.-Polish 
relations continues to be security. 
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However, the security-related aspects of U.S.-Polish relations are seen 
differently by the two countries. For Poland, they are related to a direct threat; for 
the United States, it is about burden-shifting, burden-sharing, and political 
support, all of which increase U.S. security. 
B. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The current situation in Europe and the state of transatlantic relations are 
unfavorable to Poland. Its staunch support for the United States garnered 
criticism from such “old” European states as France. Relations with Russia are 
worse than a decade ago. Therefore, Poland needs to adjust its foreign policy in 
ways that heal its relations with those countries. To mend the relationships within 
the Atlantic community and with Russia, all the players need to reconsider their 
position and be flexible in dealing with contentious issues. 
The United States should revise its unilateral approach to international 
problems and engage in peaceful debates over these issues. It would be more 
beneficial for all sides of the transatlantic partnership if the United States let its 
allies share in the burden of decision-making processes. The United States 
should also take under consideration Poland’s dilemma and its sacrifices, as well 
as its dedication to its allies, and reward its long-lasting friend and supporter 
compensation for Poland’s losses in transatlantic crisis. 
To keep Poland and Polish public opinion on its side, the United States 
must reconsider its divide et impera approach in dealing with allies. It is important 
that the U.S. administration review issues relevant to Poland, such as the U.S. 
visa requirements and greater economic assistance.  
Poland needs to revise and enhance its relations with Russia. Poland will 
no doubt be increasingly engaged in EU affairs, but its role must be changed. To 
achieve these goals and to become more than merely the land in between 
(Mitteleuropa) Russia and Germany, the Polish leadership must revise Poland’s 
foreign policy toward its eastern neighbors. In sum, Poland will remain a close 
ally to the United States for security reasons. This will not soon change because 
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there is currently no alternative. However, for economic reasons, Poland must 
enhance its position as an influential player among the European countries also. 
Despite recent events in Polish politics such as the victory of the right wing 
in its recent presidential and parliamentary elections, Poland will most likely 
remain on its current course in terms of its foreign policy. However, the overall 
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